(Three volumes)

The *Quaderni del carcere* of Antonio Gramsci were kept by Raffaele Mattioli in the vaults of the Banca Commerciale Italiana from July 6, 1937, after Gramsci's death that spring, until they were safely transported abroad a year later. Known and respected by Gramsci, Mattioli was chief executive officer of the Banca Commerciale Italiana from 1933 to 1960, when he became chairman of the board until his retirement in 1972. Columbia University Press is grateful to the Banca Commerciale Italiana for its gift in support of the costs of publishing the *Quaderni del carcere* in English.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York Oxford

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gramsci, Antonio, 1891–1937.
[Quaderni del carcere. English]
Prison notebooks / Antonio Gramsci.
p. cm.—(European perspectives)
Translation of: Quaderni del carcere.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-231-06082-3 (v. 1)
I. Title. II. Series.
DG575.G69A5 1991
335.43'092—dc20
[B]
91-22910
CIP

Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are Smyth-sewn and printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper.

Book design by Jennifer Dossin

Printed in the United States of America
c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Antonio Gramsci
PRISON NOTEBOOKS

VOLUME I

Edited with Introduction by Joseph A. Buttigieg
Translated by Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callari

(Three volumes
Notebooks 1–8)

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK

tempts to construct a justificatory system for the individualists of action; naturally, the same justifications apply to everybody, to the judges, the jurors, the executioner. Every social element is enclosed within the net of its sensations, like a pig trapped in an iron barrel and unable to escape from it; the individualist hurls the "petard," the judge condemns, the executioner beheads. There is no escape. It is a voluntarism which, in order to justify itself morally, negates itself in a tragicomic manner. The analysis of this declaration reveals how these individual "deeds" were the result of a moral disorder in French society that lasted from 1870 right up to the time of Dreyfusism, in which it finds its collective outburst.

With respect to Henry, the book contains a letter by a certain Galtey (I think, but one must check) concerning Henry's repressed love for Galtey's wife.[3] This woman, upon learning that Henry had been in love with her (it seems that she had been unaware of it), declares to a journalist that had she known she would have, perhaps, given herself to him. In the letter, the husband writes that he has no complaints about his wife's declarations and explains: if a man has failed to embody his woman's romantic dream of a Prince Charming (or something of the sort), so much the worse for him; he must accept another replacing him. This mixture of Prince Charming and materialistic rationalism is typical.

In his declaration at the Lyons trial of 1894 (check), Kropotkin asserts with conviction that the final upheaval will occur within ten years: the tone of certainty is noteworthy.[4]

Cf. Notebook 16, §23.

§⟨3⟩. *Church-State relations.* *Vorwärts* of 14 June 1929, in an article on the Concordat between the Vatican City and Prussia, says that "following the political changes that have occurred in Germany, Rome considers (the previous legislation which in fact already constituted a concordat) defunct."[1] This could be a very important precedent and should be remembered.

Cf. Notebook 16, §11.

§⟨4⟩. *Natural law and Catholicism.* The current polemicists against natural law carefully avoid recalling that it is an integral part of Catholicism and its doctrine. A study that demonstrated the close relationship between religion and the "immortal principles" would be interesting. The Catholics themselves admit these relationships when they assert the French Revolution gave rise to a "heresy"; that is, they recognize that it is a question of a doctrinal split within one and the same mentality and

monopoly will necessarily be limited over time and foreign competition on an equal level will make the high wages disappear along with the profits. Besides, it is well known that high wages are connected only with a labor aristocracy; they do not pertain to all American workers.

Cf. Notebook 22, §10, §11, §12, and §13.

§<53>. *Concordats and international treaties.* The capitulation of the modern state taking place through the concordats is being camouflaged by verbally equating concordats with international treaties.[1] A concordat, however, is not an ordinary international treaty; a concordat constitutes, de facto, an interference with sovereignty in the territory of just one state: all the articles of a concordat apply to the citizens of only one state, over whom the sovereign power of a foreign state claims and exercises certain rights and powers of jurisdiction. What powers has Prussia acquired over Vatican City by virtue of the recent concordat?[2] Furthermore, the founding of Vatican City as a state gives a semblance of legitimacy to the legal fiction that the concordat is a bilateral treaty. Yet concordats used to be drawn up even before Vatican City existed, which means that territory is not essential for papal authority. It is a pretense, for while a concordat limits the state authority of one [contracting] party in its own territory and influences and determines its legislation and administration, there is no mention of any limitations concerning the territory of the other party. A concordat, then, is the recognition of a dual sovereignty in just one state territory. It is certainly not the same form of supranational sovereignty that was formally attributed to the pope during the Middle Ages, but it is a compromise derived from it. Besides, even during the height of papal splendor and supranational power, things did not go so smoothly: even though recognized juridically, papal supremacy was de facto strongly resisted, and in the best of circumstances it boiled down to political, economic, and fiscal privileges for the bishoprics of individual countries. In any case, the concordat fundamentally impairs the autonomous character of the sovereignty of the modern state. Does the state gain anything in exchange? It certainly does, but what it obtains pertains only to its own territory with respect to its own citizens. The state gains the following: that the church will not interfere with but rather approve and uphold the exercise of power by the state. The church promises to obtain for the state the consent of a segment of the governed that the state implicitly acknowledges it cannot obtain on its own: thus the capitulation of the state; thus the state places itself under the tutelage of a sovereignty that it acknowledges to be superior. The word concordat is symptomatic. . . . The articles on the concordat published by *Nuovi Studi* are among the most

interesting, and they lend themselves most easily to rebuttal.[3] Recall the "treaty" that Georgia had to make in 1920 following Denikin's defeat.[4]

But even when it comes to the modern world, what is the practical significance of the situation created in a particular state by the stipulations of a concordat? It signifies the public recognition of special political privileges for a *caste* of citizens *of the same state.* The form is no longer the same as in the Middle Ages, but the substance is. In the course of modern history, this caste had seen the monopoly of the social role that explained and justified its existence—the monopoly of culture and education—attacked and destroyed. The concordat recognizes this monopoly once again, albeit in an attenuated and controlled form, since it secures for the caste certain basic positions that it would be unable to maintain if it were to rely solely on its own powers and on the intrinsic ties between its conception of the world and actual reality.

Therefore, the underhanded and sordid struggle of the secular and secularist intellectuals against the caste intellectuals to save their autonomy and their role is understandable. But their intrinsic capitulation and their detachment from the state is undeniable. The intellectual or moral character of the concrete state, of a particular state, is determined by its legislation and not by the abstract polemics of cultural snipers. When the latter declare "we are the state," they are only saying that the so-called unitary state is no longer such and that there is a very serious split within it. And this split is all the more serious because it is affirmed by the legislators and the statesmen themselves, who maintain that the state is two things simultaneously: on the one hand, there is the state made up of the laws that are written and applied, and on the other hand there is the state made up of those minds that deep down do not acknowledge the efficacy of those laws and attempt underhandedly to limit the laws and empty them of their ethical content when they are applied. It is the Machiavellianism of puny political adventurers: the philosophers of actual idealism, especially those in the group of trained parrots associated with *Nuovi Studi,*[5] can be said to be the most notorious victims of Machiavelli. A strange and interesting aspect of this issue is the *division of labor* that is being established between the caste and the secular intellectuals: the intellectual and moral formation of the very young (elementary and secondary schools) is left to the former, and the subsequent development of young people at university is left to the latter.[6] The field of university education, however, is not placed under the same monopolistic regime to which elementary and secondary education is subordinated. In fact, there exists the University of Sacro Cuore, and it will be possible to establish other Catholic universities on an equal footing with the state universities.[7] The consequences are obvious: elementary and secondary schools are the schools of the common people and the petty bourgeoisie, social strata that

in the field of education are entirely monopolized by the caste, since the great majority of individuals from these social strata never make it to the university; in other words, they will not experience modern education in its advanced critical-historical phase; the only education they will know is dogmatic education. The university is the ruling class's own school, and it is the mechanism by means of which the ruling class selects individuals from the other classes to incorporate into its governing, administrative, and managerial personnel. However, with the existence, on equal footing, of Catholic universities, not even the formation of this ruling personnel will be unified and homogeneous any longer. Furthermore, within its own universities, the caste will bring about a concentration of secular-religious culture, the like of which has not been seen for many decades, that will be much better situated, de facto, than the secular concentration. In fact, the organizational efficacy of secular culture is not even remotely comparable to the organizational efficacy of the church, which stands wholly as a block backing and supporting its own university. If the state is no longer, de facto, the organization of secular culture, because its legislation concerning religion is what it is and because its equivocation necessarily favors the church (given the latter's formidable structure and homogeneously organized mass influence), and if the degrees of the two types of universities have equal standing, then obviously the Catholic universities will tend to become themselves the mechanism for selecting the most intelligent and capable individuals from the lower classes to be admitted into the ruling class. This tendency will be fostered by the fact that there is no educational discontinuity between the secondary schools and the Catholic university, whereas such a discontinuity does exist between the secondary schools and the state universities, and by the fact that the church, throughout its whole structure, is already equipped to carry out this selection from below. From this point of view, the church is a perfectly democratic organism: the son of a peasant or an artisan can become a cardinal and a pope if he is intelligent, capable, and sufficiently pliable to let himself be absorbed by the ecclesiastical structure and to have a feeling for its particular esprit de corps, its spirit of conservation, and its present as well as future interests. If the upper echelon of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is less frequently democratic in its origins than is generally believed, this happens for complex reasons that are only partially affected by the pressures exerted by the great Catholic aristocratic families or by reasons of state (international). One very powerful reason is that many seminaries are very poorly equipped and do not bring the best out of intelligent young men. By contrast, the young aristocrat receives from his own family environment, effortlessly, a set of qualities that are of the utmost importance for an ecclesiastical career: the unperturbed confidence of his own dignity and authority and the skill of dealing with and ruling over others.

One reason for the weakness of the clergy in the past was that religion provided very few career possibilities other than an ecclesiastical career: the clergy itself was qualitatively weakened by the "shortage" of vocations or by "vocations" that came only from among intellectually subaltern elements. This crisis was already evident before the war; it was an aspect of the general crisis of fixed-income careers in nearly stagnant and inefficient personnel: in other words, the crisis of the subaltern intellectual stratum (elementary and secondary school teachers, priests, etc.) that was forced to compete with the independent professions linked to the development of industry and private capitalist organization in general (for ex., journalism, which absorbs many teachers, etc.). The invasion of universities and teachers' training colleges by women had already started. Together with women, priests started entering the university, and the curia could not prohibit them from obtaining state-recognized degrees that would enable them to compete for civil service jobs to augment their individual "finances." Many of these priests abandoned the church as soon as they obtained their degrees (during the war, this phenomenon became rather widespread as a result of mobilization). The ecclesiastical organization therefore underwent a constitutional crisis that could have been fatal to its power, if only the state had remained true to its secularist position, which did not even require an active struggle. In the struggle between different ways of life, the church was about to be defeated automatically. The state saved the church. The economic status of the clergy was improved on several occasions, while the general standard of living worsened, especially among the middle strata. The improvement was such that "vocations" have been multiplying marvelously, impressing the pontiff himself, who attributed them precisely to the new economic situation.[8] Thus the base from which suitable candidates for the priesthood are selected has grown, permitting greater rigor and stricter cultural requirements.

The ecclesiastical career, however, is not the sum total of the Vatican's possibilities, even though it is the foundation of its power. The new situation in the schools makes it possible to insert into the secular ruling class cells of lay individuals who owe their position solely to the church, and these cells will increasingly reinforce themselves. On the terrain of this mode of selection, the Church is unbeatable. By controlling the lycées and the other secondary schools through its fiduciaries, the church will pursue with its characteristic tenacity the most capable youngsters of the poorer classes and will help them to continue their studies at Catholic universities. Scholarships, together with boarding facilities set up most economically next to the universities, enable this activity. The church, in its present phase and with the impetus that the current pope has given to Catholic Action,[9] cannot content itself simply with producing priests: it wants to permeate the state [(Bellarmine's indirect government)],[10] and

this action requires laypeople, it requires a concentration of Catholic culture represented by the laity. There are many young people who could become more valuable auxiliaries of the church as university professors rather than as cardinals, etc. The base of "vocations" having been enlarged, this laical-cultural activity has enormous possibilities for extending itself.

The University of Sacro Cuore and the neoscholastic cultural center are just the first cells of this work. In the meantime, the Philosophical Congress of 1929 was symptomatic: a confrontation took place between the absolute idealists and the neoscholastics.[11] The latter participated in the congress animated by a bellicose spirit of conquest. In my view, this is what the group aimed at, namely, to appear bellicose, pugnacious, and therefore interesting to young people. The Catholics are very strong because they could not care less about the "peremptory refutations" of their idealist or materialist adversaries; they reiterate disproven theses unperturbed, ignoring everything. To them, the notion of intellectual "detachment" and intellectual honesty is incomprehensible, or else they see it as a weakness [or naïveté] of their adversaries. They rely on the power of their global organization and on the fact that the great majority of the population is not yet "modern" and, scientifically, still at the Ptolemaic stage. If the state refuses to be the center of its own autonomous culture, the church is bound to triumph. It is even more so when the state not only fails to intervene as an autonomous center but destroys every opponent of the church other than the parrotlike versions of idealism prevailing today.

The consequences of this situation will be extremely significant, but things will not go smoothly for very long. The church is a more implacable Shylock than the Jewish Shylock: it will demand its pound of flesh and not care a hoot about the victim bleeding to death. Disraeli was right: the Christians have been the more intelligent Jews who have conquered the world.[12] The church will not be reduced to its normal strength by philosophical refutations of its theoretical (theological) postulates and by Platonic assertions of the autonomy of the state; what is needed, rather, is practical action, the exaltation of human forces throughout the whole of society.

The question of the finances of the headquarters of religion: the organization of Catholicism in America makes possible the collection of huge amounts of money, in addition to Peter's pence and the regular revenues that have now been guaranteed. Is it possible that, with the state permanently subsidizing the church, international questions will arise about church intervention in the internal affairs of individual countries? This might be a smart question, as they say.

The question of finances renders the problem of the so-called inseparability of the treaty from the concordat, proclaimed by the pope, even more

interesting. Suppose the pope had to resort to this political expedient in order to exert pressure on the state: would it not give rise immediately to the problem of returning the sums of money already received (monies associated specifically with the treaty, not the concordat)?[13] But these sums of money are huge, and, one imagines, they would mostly have been spent during the first few years; therefore their restitution may be regarded as practically impossible. No state—and much less a private entity or a bank—would make such a big loan to the pope just to get him out of an awkward situation. Renunciation of the treaty would unleash such a great crisis in the practical organization of the church that its solvency would be wiped out, albeit in the long run. The financial agreement must therefore be considered as the essential part of the treaty, as the guarantee that makes the possibility of renouncing the treaty—raised for polemical reasons and to exert political pressure—virtually nil.

Cf. Notebook 16, §11.

§<54>. *1918.* "In 1918 there was an important innovation in our law, an innovation that, strangely (but there was censorship in 1918), went generally unnoticed: the state resumed subsidizing the Catholic religion, abandoning the sixty-three-year-old principle of Cavour that had been laid down on the basis of the Sardinian law of 29 May 1855: the state must not subsidize any religion." A. C. Jemolo, "Religione dello Stato e confessioni ammesse," in *Nuovi Studi di Diritto, Economia, Politica,* 1930, p. 30.

The innovation was introduced with the L<aw>. D<ecrees>. of 17 March 1918, n. 396, and 9 May 1918, n. 655. On this topic, Jemolo refers to the note in D. Schiappoli, *I recenti provvedimenti economici a vantaggio del clero* (Naples, 1922), extracted from vol. XLVIII of the *Atti della R. Accademia di Scienze morali e politiche di Napoli.*[1]

Cf. Notebook 16, §11.

§<55>. *The educational principle in elementary and secondary school.* The official introduction of a split in the educational principle separating elementary and secondary school from high school.[1] Previously, a very marked division of this kind existed only between vocational school on the one hand and secondary school and high school on the other. Elementary school was placed in a kind of limbo, because of some of its particular characteristics.

In elementary school there used to be two elements that contributed to the *education* of children: the notions of science and the citizen's right and

tania called the Sicilian Athens, or, rather, "Sicula Atene."[1] —The celebrity of Catania: Domenico Tempio, licentious poet, active after the 1693 earthquake that destroyed Catania (Antonio Prestinenza links the poet's licentious tone to the earthquake: death - life - destruction - prolifigacy.) —Vincenzo Bellini, contrasted to Tempio because of his romantic melancholy.[2]

Mario Rapisardi is the modern glory of Catania. Garibaldi writes to him: "In the vanguard of progress we will follow you"; and Victor Hugo: "Vous êtes un précurseur."—Rapisardi-Garibaldi-Victor Hugo.—The Carducci-Rapisardi polemic. —Rapisardi-De Felice (on May first, De Felice led the procession by Rapisardi's gate). —Socialist populism mixed with the superstitious cult of Saint Agatha; when Rapisardi was on his death bed they wanted him to rejoin the Church: "Thus lived Argante and he died as he had lived," said Rapisardi.[3] —Alongside Rapisardi: Verga, Capuana, De Roberto, who are not, however, considered "very Sicilian," also because they are connected to continental currents and are Carducci's friends.[4] —Catania and Abruzzo in nineteenth-century Italian literature.

§⟨46⟩. *The Moderates and the intellectuals.* The Moderates had to prevail among the intellectuals. Mazzini and Gioberti. Gioberti offered the intellectuals a seemingly national and original philosophy, such that it would put Italy on the same level as the more advanced nations and give new dignity to Italian "thought";[1] Mazzini provided only aphorisms and philosophical allusions which must have seemed empty talk to many intellectuals, especially Southerners (Galiani had "mocked" that mode of thinking and writing).[2] The school question. Activity by the Moderates to introduce the pedagogical principle of "mutual teaching" (Confalonieri, Capponi, etc.); the movement of Ferrante Aporti and of the infant schools, linked also to pauperism.[3] It was the only concrete movement against the "Jesuitic" school and it was bound to be effective not only among the laity whom it endowed with a personality of their own, but also among the pro-liberal and anti-Jesuit clergy. (Hostility toward Ferrante Aporti, etc.; sheltering and educating abandoned children was a monopoly of clericalism and these initiatives broke the monopoly.)

These scholastic activities of a liberal or pro-liberal character during the Risorgimento, have great importance for understanding the mechanism of the Moderates' hegemony over the intellectuals. Scholastic activity, at all levels, has an enormous importance even economically for

intellectuals of all grades; at that time it had even greater importance given the narrowness of the social framework and the paucity of avenues open to the initiative of the intellectuals. (Today: journalism, party movements, etc., have greatly extended the intellectual scene.)

The hegemony of a central leadership over the intellectuals has these two strategic lines: "a general conception of life," a philosophy (Gioberti), which gives its adherents a "dignity" to set against the dominant ideologies as a principle of struggle; a scholastic program which interests the fraction of the intellectuals that is the most homogeneous and the most numerous (teachers, from elementary school teachers to university professors) and provides them with an appropriate activity in their technical field.

The scholars' conventions that were held repeatedly during the Risorgimento[4] had a double effect: 1) to bring together the intellectuals of the highest level, thus multiplying their influence; 2) to obtain a more rapid concentration of lower level intellectuals who through a caste spirit normally tend to follow the university professors, the great scholars.

The study of encyclopedic and specialized journals reveals another aspect of this hegemony.[5] A party, such as that of the Moderates, offered the mass of the intellectuals all the satisfactions of their general needs that could be offered by a government (by a party in government) through state services. (The Piedmontese State served this function of a "government" party perfectly after 1848; it welcomed the exiled intellectuals and provided a model of what the future unitary state would be like.)

Cf. Notebook 19, §27.

§⟨47⟩. *Hegel and associationism.* Hegel's doctrine of parties and associations as the "private" fabric of the state. It ensued historically from the political experiences of the French Revolution and was to help give greater concreteness to constitutionalism. Government by consent of the governed, but an organized consent, not the vague and generic kind which is declared at the time of elections: the state has and demands consent, but it also "educates" this consent through political and trade-union associations which, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class. Thus, in a certain sense, Hegel already goes beyond pure constitutionalism and theorizes the parliamentary state with its regime of parties. His conception of association cannot but be still vague and primitive, in between the political and the economic, in keeping with the historical experience of the times which was quite narrow and offered only one accomplished example of

§⟨122⟩. *Suggestions and stimuli.* Macaulay attributes the ease with which even the most cultured Greeks let themselves be blinded by almost puerile sophisms to the very great influence of live and spoken discourse in Greek life and education. The habit of conversation generates a certain aptitude for finding very quickly ostentatious arguments that render the adversary momentarily speechless.[1] The same observation can also be made about certain classes in modern life, as a demonstration of a weakness (workers) and a source of distrust (peasants, who upon ruminating on the things which they have heard declaimed and which momentarily impressed them with their glitter, discover the deficiencies and the superficiality of what they heard, and in the end they become habitually distrustful).

Macaulay refers to a statement by Eugene of Savoy, who said that those who became the greatest generals were the ones who were suddenly placed in charge of the army and in a situation which required them to think of large and complex maneuvers.[2] (Those who by profession attend too much to detail become bureaucratized; they see the tree but lose sight of the forest, they see the regulation but lose sight of the strategy.) To the first observation one might add that the newspaper comes very close to conversation: newspaper articles are generally written hastily, improvised, and because of the rapidity with which they are conceived they resemble, for the most part, the speeches made at meetings. There are few newspapers that have specialized editors and even the activity of these editors is, to a great extent, improvised: specialization helps make improvisation better and quicker. In Italian newspapers there are no thoughtful and careful periodic reviews (theater, for example, economic policy, etc.; the contributors make up for this only in part and, furthermore, they are not always moving in the same direction). Therefore, the solidity of culture can be measured in three levels: 1) those who only read newspapers, 2) those who read periodicals, 3) those who read books—and this does not take into account a great multitude that does not even read the newspapers and forms its opinions solely through sporadic conversations with individuals of the same general level who, however, read the newspapers, and the multitude that forms its opinions by attending periodic and electoral meetings held by speakers of vastly different levels. I was particularly struck by this indifference in Milan where *Il Sole* was allowed in prison; nevertheless, a certain number of people, even among the political prisoners, read the *Gazzetta dello Sport* instead; among 2,500 inmates, *Il Sole* sold at most 80 copies; the *Gazzetta dello Sport*, the *Domenica del Corriere*, and the *Corriere dei Piccoli* had more readers.

Cf. Notebook 16, §21.

torical concreteness of Hegel's thought must have stood out much more clearly than it does in his systematic writings. Some of Marx's assertions, it seems to me, should be considered in special relation to this "conversational" vivacity: for instance, the statement that Hegel "has men walking on their heads." Hegel really does use this image when dealing with the French Revolution; he writes that at a certain time during the French Revolution (when the new state structure was organized) "it seemed" that the world was walking on its head or something of the sort (cf.). I think that Croce asks [search the reference] from where Marx derived this image; it certainly is in one of Hegel's books (perhaps the *Philosophy of Right*; I don't remember). However, it seems to me that, given the persistence with which Marx returns to it (I think that Marx repeats the image; check), it seems to me that at a certain time it was a topic of conversation: it really seems to have sprung out of conversation, fresh, spontaneous, so little "bookish."[1]

Cf. Notebook 10, II §60.

§ ⟨153⟩. *Conversation and culture* (see the note on p. 80: *Suggestions and stimuli*).[1] Macaulay's observation is found in his essay "On the Athenian Orators" (check if this is the case for precise reference). The observation can be developed further. It is certain that for a long time culture developed especially in an oratorical or rhetorical form, that is, with little or no help from writing and other didactic means or from study in general. A new tradition begins in the Middle Ages with the convents and regular schools. Scholasticism represents the most important distinguishing feature of this tradition. To the careful observer, the study of formal logic by Scholasticism is, in fact, also a reaction against the "facileness" of demonstration by the old cultural methods. Errors of logic are especially common in oral argumentation. The art of printing, then, revolutionized the whole world of culture. Implicit in this study, then, is another one about the qualitative as well as quantitative (mass extension) changes that the technical development of the organization of culture brought to the way of thinking.

Even today, ideologically, the theater and the cinema have a speed and field of action enormously greater than the book (the theater and cinema can be compared to newspapers and periodicals); but superficially, not in depth. The academies and universities as vehicles [and organizations] of culture. In the universities, oral lectures and seminars. The professor and the assistant; the professional assistant and the "Elders of Santa Zita" in Puoti's school discussed by De Sanctis,[2] namely the formation within the same class of a "vanguard," of a spontaneous selection of students who help the teacher and continue his lectures, teaching how to study in practice.

These observations have been suggested to me by Bukharin's[a] *Historical Materialism* which betrays all the shortcomings of conversation.[3] It would be interesting to show, by way of example, all the passages that correspond to the logical errors pointed out by the Scholastics, recalling Engels' very appropriate observation that even "modes" of thinking are acquired and not innate traits, the possession of which corresponds to a professional qualification.[4] Not to possess them, not to realize that one does not possess them, not to set oneself the problem of acquiring them through an apprenticeship is like wanting to construct an automobile while knowing how to use and having access to the workshop and the tools of a village blacksmith. The study of the "old formal logic" has now fallen into disfavor, partly for good reason. But the problem of requiring an apprenticeship in logic reappears if one raises the problem of creating a new culture on a new social base which, unlike the old class of intellectuals, has no traditions. A traditional "intellectual bloc" with its complex articulations is capable of assimilating the element of "apprenticeship" into the organic development of a science without even submitting to the need of a formal apprenticeship. But even this does not occur without difficulty and loss. The development of professional technical schools in all the post-elementary grades has reopened the problem. Recall Prof. Peano's assertion that even in the Polytechnic and in the mathematical sciences, the students from the grammar schools turned out to be better prepared than those from the technical schools and institutes.[5] This better preparation came from the comprehensive "humanistic" education (history, literature, philosophy). Why cannot mathematics yield the same results? Mathematics has been drawn close to logic. And yet there is an enormous difference. Mathematics is essentially based on the numerical series, that is, on an infinite series of equivalencies (1 = 1) which can be combined in a theoretically infinite number of ways. Formal logic "tends" to do the same thing, but only up to a certain point. Its abstract nature is retained only through the early stage of learning, in its direct, bare and crude formulation, but it is put into practice concretely in the very discourse in which the abstract formulation itself is carried out. The language exercises performed in grammar school demonstrate this: in Latin-Italian, Greek-Italian translations, there is never identity between the two languages, or at least the identity which seems to exist in the early stages of learning ("rosa" = "rosa") becomes increasingly complicated as the learning process progresses; in other words, it increasingly distances itself from the mathematical scheme until it reaches the historical and psychological level in which nuances, "unique and individual" expressiveness prevail. And this happens not only when comparing two languages, but also in the study of the history of the "language" itself, namely in the

[a] In the manuscript "Bukh."

"semantic" variations of the same sound-word through time and of its altered functions during that time. (Changes in sound, morphology, syntax, semantics.) (*This series of observations must be continued and placed in relation with preceding notes.*)

Cf. Notebook 16, §21.

§⟨154⟩. *Clergy and intellectuals.* Is there an organic study of the clergy as a "class-caste"? It seems to me that it would be indispensable as a beginning and as a condition for the whole study that remains to be done on the function of religion in the historical and intellectual development of humanity. The precise juridical and de facto situation of the Church and the clergy in various periods and countries, its economic conditions and functions, its exact relations with ruling classes and with the state, etc., etc.

§⟨155⟩. *Marx and Hegel* (See p. 97).[1] Antonio Labriola, in "Da un secolo all'altro": "It is befitting that the reactionary Hegel should have been the one to say, based on reason, that those men (at the Convention) were the first, after Anaxagoras, to have tried to turn the idea of the world upside down" (see A. Labriola, *Da un secolo all'altro*, ed. Dal Pane, p. 45).[2]

Cf. Notebook 10, II §60.

§⟨156⟩. *Past and present.* How the present is a *criticism* of the past, besides [and because of] "surpassing" it. But should the past be discarded for this reason? What should be discarded is that which the present has "intrinsically" criticized and that part of ourselves which corresponds to it. What does this mean? That we must have an exact consciousness of this real criticism and express it not only theoretically but *politically*. In other words, we must stick closer to the present, which we ourselves have helped create, while conscious of the past and its continuation (and revival).

§⟨157⟩. *Croce and the intellectuals.* What has been the significance of his book on the *Storia d'Italia dal 71*[a] *al 1915*?[1] It is interesting to observe Croce's shift from a "critical" to an "active" position. Bonomi's

[a] In the manuscript: "70."

§⟨123⟩. *Search the exact historical origin* of certain principles of modern pedagogy: the active school, or the friendly collaboration between teacher and student; the open school; the need to allow the spontaneous abilities of the student to develop freely under the watchful but not conspicuous control of the teacher.

Switzerland has made a great contribution to modern pedagogy (Pestalozzi, etc.),[1] through the tradition of Rousseau in Geneva; in reality, this pedagogy is a confused form of philosophy connected to a set of empirical rules. It has been forgotten that Rousseau's ideas are a violent reaction against the school and the pedagogical methods of the Jesuits and, in this respect, represent progress: but, then, a sort of church came into being which paralyzed the study of pedagogy and gave rise to some strange involutions (in the doctrines of Gentile and Lombardo-Radice).[2] "Spontaneity" is one of these involutions: one almost imagines that a child's brain is like a ball of thread which the teacher helps to unwind.[3] In reality, every generation educates, that is, it forms the new generation, and education is a struggle against instincts linked to rudimentary biological functions, a struggle against nature, to dominate it and to create the man who is "in touch" with his times. It is forgotten that from the time he starts "to see and to touch," perhaps a few days after birth, the child accumulates sensations and images which multiply themselves and become complex with the acquisition of language. "Spontaneity," if analyzed, becomes increasingly problematical. Furthermore, "school," that is direct educational activity, is only a fraction of the life of the student who comes into contact with both human society and the *societas rerum*, and from these "extra-scholastic" sources develops standards of judgment of far greater importance than is commonly believed. The common—intellectual and manual—school has the additional advantage of putting the child simultaneously in touch with human history and the history of "things" under the control of the teacher.

§⟨124⟩. *The Futurists.* A group of small schoolboys who escaped from a Jesuit college, created a small ruckus in the nearby woods, and were brought back under the rod of the forest warden.[1]

§<49>. *The intellectuals*.[a] First question: are intellectuals an autonomous social group, or does every social group have its own category of intellectuals? The problem is complex, because up to the present time the historical process of formation of the different categories of intellectuals has assumed a variety of forms. The most important of these forms are two:

1. Every social group coming into existence on the primal basis of an essential function in the world of economic production creates together with itself, organically, a rank or several ranks of intellectuals who give it homogeneity and a consciousness of its own function in the economic sphere: the capitalist entrepreneur creates along with himself the economist, the scientist of political economy. Moreover, it is the case that every entrepreneur is also an intellectual in the sense that he must possess a certain technical capacity, not only in the narrowly defined field of economics but in other fields as well—at least those fields closest to economic production (he must be an organizer of masses of men; he must be an organizer of the "confidence" of the investors in his business, of the buyers of his products, etc.). If not all the entrepreneurs, at least an elite among them must have the technical capacity (of an intellectual nature) to be organizers of society in general, including its whole complex body of services right up to the state, in order to obtain the most favorable conditions for the expansion of their own group or at least the capacity to choose the "underlings" who are specialists in this activity of organizing general relations beyond the ambit of the business.

Even the feudal lords possessed a capacity of a particular kind—military capacity—and, in fact, the crisis of feudalism begins at the very moment when the aristocracy loses its monopoly of military technical capacity.

2. But every social group emerging into history out of the economic structure finds or has found—at least in all of past history—preexisting categories of intellectuals that moreover seemed to represent a historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated changes in social and political forms. The most typical of these categories of intellectuals is that of the ecclesiastics, who for a long time monopolized a number of important services (religious ideology, schools and education, and "theory" in general with regard to science, philosophy, morals, justice, etc., as well as charity and good works, etc.). However, there are several other categories that in the feudal regime were, to some extent at least, juridically on a par with the aristocracy: the learned "theorists," the nonecclesiastical philosophers, etc. (The clergy, in fact, exercised the feudal ownership

[a]In the manuscript, the title of this note, "*Gli intellettuali*," is written in cursive like all the other titles, but the size of the lettering is distinctly larger than in other titles of individual notes. Furthermore, the note begins on a fresh page (p. 11r) in the manuscript; Gramsci left the last two lines of the previous page (p. 10v) blank.

of land in the same way as the nobility, and it was economically on a par with the nobility; but there was also, for example, an aristocracy of the gown, in addition to an aristocracy of the sword, etc. To the economists who come into existence with the entrepreneurs, mentioned in the earlier paragraph, one must add the industrial technicians and "applied" scientists, a category of intellectuals that is closely[a] linked to the social group of the entrepreneurs, etc.) Since these categories experience the continuity of their intellectual title through an "esprit de corps" (Croce feels as if he is linked to Aristotle more than to Agnelli,[1] etc.), they thus appear to have a certain autonomy from the dominant social group, and taken as a whole they may seem like an independent social group with its own characteristics, etc.

Second question: what are the utmost limits of the meaning of the term "intellectual"? It is difficult to find a single criterion that characterizes equally well all the disparate activities of intellectuals and, at the same time, distinguishes them in an essential way from the activities of other social groups. The most widespread methodological error, it seems to me, has been to look for the essential characteristic in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activity rather than in the system of relations wherein this activity (and the group that personifies it) is located within the general ensemble of social relations. Indeed: (1) The worker is not specifically characterized by his manual or instrumental work but by his working in specific conditions and within specific social relations (apart from the consideration that purely physical labor does not exist and that even Taylor's term "trained gorilla"[2] is a metaphor to indicate how far one can go in a certain direction: in any physical work, no matter how mechanical and degraded, there is a minimum of technical skill, that is, a minimum of creative intellectual activity). (2) It has already been pointed out that, to some extent, the entrepreneur, by virtue of his very function, must possess a certain number of skills of an intellectual nature, even though his social position is not determined by these skills but by the general social relations, which are characterized by the position of the entrepreneur within industry.

These distinctions having been made, it is possible to conclude, for now, that: the relationship between the intellectuals and production is not direct, as in the case of the fundamental social groups, but mediated, and it is mediated by two types of social organization: (a) by civil society, that is, by the ensemble of private organizations in society; (b) by the state. The intellectuals have a function in the "hegemony" that is exercised throughout society by the dominant group and in the "domination" over society that is embodied by the state, and this function is precisely "organizational" or connective. The intellectuals have the function of organizing

[a]In the manuscript, above the word "closely," Gramsci inserted "organically."

the social hegemony of a group and that group's domination of the state; in other words, they have the function of organizing the consent that comes from the prestige attached to the function in the world of production and the apparatus of coercion for those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively or for those moments of crisis of command and leadership when spontaneous consent undergoes a crisis. As a result of this analysis, the concept of intellectuals is broadened very extensively, but this seems to me the only possible way to arrive at a concrete approximation of reality.

The greatest difficulty in accepting this way of posing the question, it seems to me, arises out of the following: that the function of organizing social hegemony and state domination has various levels and among these levels some are purely manual and instrumental—carrying out orders rather than having responsibility, being an agent rather than a bureaucrat or an official, etc.; obviously, however, nothing prevents one from making this kind of distinction (nurses and doctors in a hospital, sacristans-caretakers and priests in a church, janitors and teachers in a school, etc., etc.).

From an intrinsic point of view, intellectual activity can be differentiated by levels that in moments of extreme opposition become a genuine difference in quality—on the highest rung, we find the "creators" of the various sciences, philosophy, poetry, etc.; on the lowest, the most humble "administrators and disseminators" of the intellectual wealth of the tradition—but taken as a whole, they all have a sense of solidarity. It is even the case that the lowest strata have a stronger sense of this corps solidarity, from which they derive a certain "conceitedness"[3] that frequently renders them vulnerable to taunts and jokes.

It should be noted that in the modern world the category of intellectuals, in this sense, has undergone an expansion of unprecedented proportions. Mass formation has standardized individuals both in terms of technical ability and psychologically, giving rise to the same phenomena as in all other standardized masses: competition among individuals that creates unemployment, the need for protective professional organizations, etc.

The different positions of the urban and the rural type of intellectuals.[4] Intellectuals of the urban type are rather closely tied to industry. They have the same function as subaltern officers in the army: they establish the relationship between the entrepreneur and the instrumental masses, they execute the production plan drawn by the general staff of industry. The urban intellectuals are, on average, very standardized, while the top intellectuals are increasingly mistaken for the real, "organic" general staff of the upper industrial class.

Intellectuals of the rural type bring the peasant masses into contact with the local or state administration (lawyers, notaries, etc.), and because of this function they are of greater political importance: this professional

mediation, in fact, is hard to separate from political mediation. Furthermore: in the country, the intellectual (priest, lawyer, teacher, notary, doctor, etc.) represents a social model for the average peasant, who aspires to escape from his condition in order to improve himself. The peasant always thinks that at least one of his sons could become an intellectual (especially a priest), which means becoming a gentleman, thus raising the social level of the family and facilitating its economic life through the connections he is bound to have with other gentlemen. The attitude of the peasant toward the intellectual is twofold: he admires the social position of the intellectual and, in general, the position of the state employee, but he sometimes feigns to disdain it; in other words, his instinctive admiration is interlaced with elements of envy and burning anger. It is impossible to understand anything about the peasants without taking into consideration their effective subordination to the intellectuals and without grasping the fact that every development of the peasant masses to a certain extent is linked to and depends on the movements of the intellectuals.

Urban intellectuals are a different matter. Factory technicians do not exercise any political influence on the instrumental masses, or at least that phase has already been superseded. Sometimes precisely the reverse takes place: the instrumental masses—at least, through their own organic intellectuals—exercise an influence over the technicians.

The crux of the issue, however, remains the distinction between intellectuals as an organic category of every social group and intellectuals as a traditional category, a distinction that opens up a whole series of problems and possible historical studies. The most interesting problem is that which has to do with the analysis of the political party from this point of view. What becomes of the political party in relation to the problem of the intellectuals? The political party, it seems to me, can be said to be precisely the mechanism that carries out in civil society the same function that the state carries out, to a greater extent, in political society. In other words, it secures the bonding of the organic intellectuals of a social group with traditional intellectuals, a function it can carry out as part of its basic function, which is to lift the "economic" members of a social group to the level of "political intellectuals," that is, organizers of all the functions intrinsic to the organic development of an integral civil and political society. Indeed, one might say that within its own sphere, the political party fulfills its function more organically than the state does in its broader sphere. An intellectual who joins the political party of a particular social group blends with the organic intellectuals of that same group and binds himself closely to that group, something that does not come about through participation in the life of the state other than poorly, if at all. Indeed, it is the case that many intellectuals think they are themselves the state, a belief that, given the magnitude of the category, sometimes

has important consequences and leads to unpleasant complications for the economic social group that really is the state. All members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals; this is an affirmation that can lend itself to ridicule, and yet, on reflection, nothing could be truer. One must make distinctions of gradation: a party may comprise a larger or smaller number from the higher or lower grades. But this is not what matters; what matters is the function, which is to educate and lead: namely, an intellectual function. A businessman does not join a political party in order to do business, nor an industrialist in order to increase and improve his production, nor a farmer in order to learn new methods of cultivation, even though some aspects of these needs of the businessman, the industrialist, and the farmer may be satisfied in the party. (The general view runs counter to this; it holds that the "politicking" businessman, industrialist, or farmer stands to lose rather than gain, which is debatable.) The professional unions exist to address these goals, within certain limits; in them, the economic-corporate function of the businessman, the industrialist, or the farmer finds its most appropriate framework. In the political party, the elements of an economic social group go beyond this moment of their historical development and become agents of general activities that are national and international in character (cf. the note on "Relations between structure and superstructure" on p. 67).[5] This function of the political party should come much more clearly into view from a concrete historical analysis of how the categories of organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals have evolved both on the terrain of various national developments and on the terrain of the development of the most important diverse social groups within the context of different nations, especially those groups whose economic activity has been primarily instrumental. The formation of traditional intellectuals is the most interesting historical question. It is definitely related to slavery in the classical world and to the status of freedmen from Greece and the Orient within the social organization of the Roman Empire. This social, but also national and racial, separation between sizable bodies of intellectuals and the ruling class of the Roman Empire reproduces itself, after the fall of Rome, in the separation between Germanic warriors and intellectuals of Latin origins, successors of the freedmen-intellectuals. This phenomenon is intertwined with the emergence and development of Catholicism and ecclesiastical organization, which for many centuries absorbed most intellectual activity and exercised a monopoly of intellectual administration, including penal sanctions against those who sought to oppose or even elude the monopoly.

This phenomenon ties in with the other phenomenon of the cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals, on which many notes have been written, scattered in the various notebooks.[6]

There are many noticeable differences between one nation and another in the development of European intellectuals; I will point out the most noteworthy ones, which should be more closely examined (moreover, all the statements contained in this note should be regarded as mere cues and stimuli for memory that need to be checked and probed more deeply):[7]

1. In the case of Italy, the central fact is precisely the international or cosmopolitan function of its intellectuals that is both cause and effect of the fragmented state of the peninsula from the fall of the Roman Empire until 1870.

2. France provides a complete example of a harmonious development of all the nation's energies and, especially, of the categories of intellectuals. When in 1789 a new social group surfaced politically in history, it was already fully equipped for all its social functions, and therefore it fought for total domination of the nation. It did not have to make any essential compromises with the old classes; instead, it subordinated them to itself. The first intellectual cells of the new type emerge alongside the first economic cells; even the ecclesiastical organization is influenced by them (Gallicanism, very early development of struggles between church and state). This massive intellectual establishment explains the intellectual function of France in the second half of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century, an international and cosmopolitan function of irradiation and of an expansion that had the character of organic imperialism, therefore quite different from the intellectual function of Italy, which was characterized by a haphazard personal migration whose effect was to preclude rather than enable the development of the national base.

3. In Russia, several points: the political [commercial] organization was created by the Normans (Varangians) and the religious organization by the Byzantine Greeks; at a later time, the Germans and the French provided the protoplasm of Russian history with a strong skeleton. The national forces were passive, and, perhaps for that very reason, they assimilated foreign influences and even foreigners themselves, Russifying them. In the more recent historical period, the opposite phenomenon takes place: an elite from among the most active, enterprising, and disciplined people emigrates abroad, it assimilates the culture of the most advanced Western countries, and it does so without losing the most essential characteristics of its nationality: that is, without breaking its sentimental and historical ties with its own people. Having thus completed its intellectual apprenticeship, it returns to its country, compelling the people to a forced awakening. The difference between this elite and the German one (of Peter the Great, for example) is to be found in its essentially national-popular character: it could not be assimilated by Russian passivity because it was itself an energetic reaction of Russia against its own historical passivity. On

another terrain and in quite different temporal and spatial conditions, this Russian phenomenon can be compared to the birth of the American nation (the United States): the Anglo-Saxon immigrants in America, too, are an intellectual, but above all a moral, elite. I am referring, of course, to the early immigrants, the pioneers, protagonists of the religious struggles in England, defeated but neither humiliated nor disheartened. Besides moral and strong-willed energy, they brought with them to America a certain level of civilization, a certain stage of European historical evolution that, once transplanted into the virgin soil of America and through the agency of such people, continued to develop the forces implicit in its nature but at an incomparably faster pace than in old Europe, where there is a whole set of restraints (moral and intellectual, incorporated in certain groups of the population) that are inimical to such a fast process and bring every initiative down to the level of mediocrity, diluting it in time and space.

4. In England the development is very different from France. The new social group that came into existence on the basis of modern industrialism has grown remarkably on the economic-corporate level, but in the intellectual-political field it gropes its way in the dark. The organic intellectuals—namely, those who came into existence on the same industrial terrain as the economic group—are very numerous, but at the most advanced stage of development we find that the old class of landowners preserves its quasi-monopolistic position. It loses its economic supremacy but maintains for a long time its political-intellectual supremacy and is assimilated as a stratum of leaders by the new group in power. In other words: the old landed class is joined to the industrialists by a kind of suture similar to the one by which in other countries the dominant classes are joined to the "traditional intellectuals."

5. The English phenomenon appears in Germany as well, aggravated by other complicating phenomena. Germany, too, like Italy, has been the seat of a universalistic, supranational institution and ideology (the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation); it provided the medieval cosmopolis with a certain number of personnel, impoverishing its own national energies, and for a long time this personnel perpetuated the territorial disunity of the Middle Ages. Industrial development took place within a semifeudal framework that remained in place until November 1918, and the landowning Junkers, in alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, retained a political-intellectual supremacy much greater than that of their English counterparts. They were the traditional intellectuals of the German industrialists, but they enjoyed special privileges and had a strong consciousness of themselves as an independent group, based on the fact that they held considerable economic power over the land, which was more "productive" than in England. (The Prussian Junkers resemble a priestly caste that carries on a basically intellectual activity but at the same time has its own economic

base and is not dependent on the liberality of the dominant group. Moreover, it is not hard to see how the different situations of the English and Prussian nobilities were to become comparable with the passage of time, in spite of the fact that Germany's military might on the ground—unlike England's exclusively naval power—provided the Junkers with an organizational base favoring the preservation of their political monopoly.)

Outside Europe there are other distinct instances of the development of the categories of intellectuals to be examined and studied. In the United States one should note the absence of traditional intellectuals and therefore the different equilibrium of the intellectuals in general: a massive formation of all the modern superstructures on an industrial base. The necessity of an equilibrium does not arise out of the need to fuse the organic intellectuals with the traditional intellectuals who, as a category, do not exist; rather, it arises out of the need to fuse together in a single national crucible the different types of culture brought in by immigrants of diverse national origins. The absence of traditional intellectuals explains, at least in part, on the one hand the existence of only two parties that could easily be reduced to just one (cf. with France, and not only in the postwar period when the multiplication of parties became a general phenomenon) and on the other hand the endless proliferation of churches (I think that 213 Protestant sects have been counted; contrast with France and with the fierce struggles that were waged in order to preserve the religious and moral unity of the French people). There are various notes on the American intellectuals scattered in different notebooks.[8]

There is another interesting symptom in America that still has to be examined: the formation of a surprising number of black intellectuals who absorb American culture and technical knowledge. One might look into the indirect influence that these black American intellectuals could exercise on the backward masses in Africa, and even the direct influence they could exercise if either of the following hypotheses became true: (1) if American expansionism used its American blacks as agents to take hold of the African market (something of this sort has already happened, but I do not know to what extent); (2) if racial conflicts in America became exacerbated to such a degree as to cause the exodus and return to Africa of those black intellectual elements who are the most spiritually independent and active and therefore the ones least likely to submit to some possible legislation even more humiliating than the current widespread customs. This raises the question: (1) of language—since the language of American blacks is English, whereas in Africa there are myriad dialects; (2) of whether national sentiment can replace racial sentiment, raising the African continent to the function of common fatherland of all blacks (it would be the first case of an entire continent being regarded as a single nation). American blacks, it seems to me, are bound to have more of a neg-

ative than a positive national and racial spirit; a spirit, in other words, born out of the struggle waged by the whites in order to isolate and dishearten them. But was this not the case with the Jews until the end of the eighteenth century? *Liberia*, already Americanized and with English as its official language, could become the Zion of American blacks, aiming to become all of Africa, to be the Piedmont of Africa.

The study of the question of the intellectuals in South and Central America, in my view, should take into account the following basic conditions: the category of traditional intellectuals does not exist in South and Central America either, but the situation does not present itself in the same terms as in the United States. In fact, at the root of development in these countries we find the Spanish and Portuguese civilization of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, characterized by the Counter-Reformation and by militarism. To this day, the most resistant crystallizations in these countries are the clergy and the army, two categories of intellectuals that, in part, carry on the traditions of the European mother countries. Furthermore, the industrial base is very limited and has not developed complicated superstructures: the majority of intellectuals are of the rural type, and since large estate holdings and extensive property ownership by the church predominate, these intellectuals are linked to the clergy and the big landowners. The problem is complicated by the great masses of Indians, who in some countries constitute the majority of the population. Generally speaking, one can say that South and Central America are still in a situation like that of the Kulturkampf[9] and the Dreyfus trial; that is, a situation in which the secular and civil element has yet to pass through the stage at which the clergy and the military caste are subordinated to secular politics. As a result, Freemasonry and forms of cultural organization such as the "positivist church" constitute a very important opposition to Jesuit influence. Recent events (I am writing in November 1930), from Calles's Mexican Kulturkampf[10] to the popular-military movements in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia, show just how true these assertions are. There are notes on South American intellectuals scattered in various notebooks.[11]

Another kind of manifestation of the development of intellectuals can be found in India, China, and Japan. Not that India and China should be confused with Japan. Japan comes close to the English and German type of development—that is, an industrial civilization that develops within a semifeudal framework—but, as far as I can tell, more like the English than the German type. In China there is the problem of the script, an expression of the total separation of the intellectuals from the people. In India and China one encounters the phenomenon of the enormous gap between the religion of the people and the religion of the clergy and the intellectuals; it, too, is related to the separation between the intellectuals and the people. This phenomenon of different beliefs and of the different ways in

which the various strata of society—but especially the clergy on the one hand and the mass of believers on the other—understand and practice the same religion needs to be studied in general, even though its most extreme manifestations occur in Asian countries. I believe that the difference in Protestant countries is relatively slight. It is very noticeable in Catholic countries, but there are differences of degree: lesser in the Catholic parts of Germany and in France; greater in Italy, especially in the South and the islands; and very great on the Iberian peninsula and in Latin American countries. The phenomenon assumes greater proportions in the Orthodox countries where one must take into account three levels of the same religion: that of the high clergy and the monks, that of the secular clergy, and that of the people. It reaches catastrophic proportions in East Asia (not in Japan), where the religion of the people often has nothing to do with the religion found in the books, even though both of them are called by the same name.

The problem of the intellectuals has many other aspects besides those mentioned in the preceding pages. It is necessary to compose these aspects into an organic, systematic, and logical overview. Activities of a predominantly intellectual character; institutions linked with cultural activity; methods and methodological problems of intellectual work; periodicals and newspapers as organizations of intellectual dissemination; academies and various associations as institutions for the collegial elaboration of cultural life. I have written notes on many of these themes here and there in various notebooks under different titles, but especially under the title "Types of periodicals."

One may say, generally, that in modern civilization all practical activities have become so complex and the sciences so intertwined with life that each activity tends to create a school for its own specialists and hence to create a group of intellectual specialists to teach in these schools. Thus, alongside the type of school that may be called "humanistic"—because it is aimed at developing in each individual human being an as-yet-undifferentiated general culture, the fundamental power to think and to find a direction in life—a whole system of specialized schools is being created at various levels, for entire vocational branches or for professions that are already specialized and precisely defined. Indeed, one may say that the educational crisis raging today is linked precisely to the fact that this process of differentiation is taking place chaotically, without a carefully studied plan, without clear and precise principles: the crisis of the school curriculum—that is, of the general orientation of the formative process—is, to a great extent, a complication of the more general crisis. The fundamental division of the middle school into vocational and classical was a rational scheme: the vocational school for the instrumental classes, the classical school for the dominant classes and the intellectuals. However,

the development of the urban as well as agricultural industrial base tended to foster the new type of urban intellectual, and therefore school was divided into classical and technical (vocational but not manual), which called into question the very principle of the pursuit of general culture, of a humanistic orientation, of a general culture based on the classical tradition. This pursuit, once questioned, can be said to be destroyed, since its formative capacity was largely based on the general prestige enjoyed by a particular form of civilization. The tendency today is to abolish every type of school that is "disinterested" (in other words, not motivated by immediate interests) and "formative" or else to leave only a scaled-down specimen of such a school for a tiny elite of rich persons and young ladies who need not bother with preparing themselves for the future. The tendency is to continue propagating specialized vocational schools in which the student's destiny and future activity are predetermined.

The crisis will certainly have a solution, which, logically, should be along the following lines: to start with, a common school of general humanistic culture, with the right balance between development of the ability to work manually (technically, industrially) and development of the ability to think, to work intellectually. From this type of common school, students would move on, by way of vocational orientation, to one of the specialized vocational (in the broad sense) schools, etc.

In any case, one must bear in mind the principle that every practical activity tends to create for itself a special school, just as every intellectual activity tends to create its own "cultural association." As a result, every directive organism will also have to split its activity into two basic parts: the deliberative part, which is its essential activity, and the informative-cultural part, in which questions that require discussion are first discussed "academically," so to speak. This is already happening today, but in a bureaucratic manner: every deliberative body has its own specialized departments of experts who prepare the materials for discussions and deliberations. This is one of the mechanisms by which the bureaucracy ends up in control in democratic parliamentary regimes. It seems to me, in fact, that the question will arise of incorporating within the deliberative and directive bodies themselves the technical capability that is a prerequisite for expertise.

On this topic, check what I have written in one of the notes under the rubric "Types of periodicals."[12] While waiting for the formation of a group of intellectuals who are well trained to engage in regular publishing activity (in the sense of organic books, not of occasional publications or collections of articles) and as a means of encouraging such a formation, a cultural group should be formed around the typical periodical. The group would collectively criticize and elaborate the work of each individual; the work itself is assigned according to a plan and with a regard for questions

of principle (programmatic questions). The resulting work, in its final form—that is, after it has undergone collective critique and revision, and after it has been formulated in a way that is basically consonant with the collective view—should be collected in a yearbook, as I mentioned in the earlier note. Through collective discussion and criticism (made up of suggestions, advice, recommendations on method, and constructive criticism aimed at mutual education), the average level of the members of the group is raised until it is on a par with the caliber and the capability of the best-trained member. After the initial work is done, it should be possible for the chairman's office or the secretariat to have criteria and ideas concerning the assignment of further work and its distribution among the entire personnel, in such a way as to induce the individual members to specialize and to create for themselves the conditions of specialization: indexes, bibliographical surveys, collections of specialized basic works, etc. The method of work should be very strict and rigorous: no improvisation and no bombast. The work, in written form and distributed in advance to the members of the group, should be criticized in writing, in concise notes that list shortcomings, suggestions, points that require elucidation, etc. A fruitful working principle could be introduced: each member of the group who is in charge of some task could choose from among the other members of the group a mentor who would guide him and help him with "maieutic" skill—that is, without taking his place but rather only helping him to work and to develop for himself a working discipline, a method of production that would "Taylorize" him intellectually, so to speak.

Cf. Notebook 12, §1.

§<50>. *The common school.*[1] An important issue that needs to be examined when dealing with the practical organization of the common school is the setting of the various school grades according to the age and intellectual-moral maturity of the young and in keeping with the goals that the school strives for.

The common school, or the school of "humanistic" (broadly understood, and not just in the traditional sense) general culture, should aim to insert young people into active life with some measure of intellectual autonomy, that is, with a certain degree of intellectual and practical creative ability, an independent sense of direction. The fixing of the age for compulsory education varies with different general economic conditions, which, from our perspective of the common school, determine two things: (1) the need to make youngsters work in order to obtain from them, as soon as possible, some immediate productive contribution; (2) the availability of state funds devoted to public education. The funds will have to be rather

substantial because of the expansion the school system would undertake in terms of buildings, teaching materials in the broad sense, the corps of teachers. The corps of teachers, especially, will grow much larger since the lower the ratio between schoolchildren and teachers, the greater and more immediate is the effectiveness of the school. But this raises the problem of training such a corps of teachers, for which there is no easy or quick solution. The problem of buildings is not simple either because this type of school, which also aims at quick results, has to be a boarding school with dormitories, dining halls, specialized libraries, rooms suitable for seminar work, etc. Initially, then, the new type of school will have to be, and cannot but be, for elite groups of youngsters selected through competition or officially recommended by the appropriate private institutions.

If one were to use as a frame of reference the system of classical education as it exists today—(1) elementary school, (2) middle school, (3) lycée, (4) university and professional, theoretical, or practical schools of specialization—then the common school would comprise the first three levels, reorganized not only in terms of content and teaching methods but also in terms of the arrangement of the educational process. The elementary grades should last three to four years; they should teach dogmatically (relatively speaking, of course) the basic elements of the new conception of the world, in opposition to the conception of the world conveyed by the traditional environment (folklore in its full scope), in addition to [imparting], obviously, the fundamental instruments of culture: reading, writing, arithmetic, elements of geography, history, rights and duties (that is, the first notions of the state and society). The middle school could be reduced to four years and the lycée to two, so that a child who started school at the age of six would be able to complete common school by the age of fifteen or sixteen. One may object that such a course of study is too hard because it is too fast paced for it to achieve the same results as the present system of classical education. In response one may say that the new system, taken as a whole, contains within it the general elements that in fact make the present system too slow for certain students. Which elements are these? In a number of families, particularly among the intellectual classes, children find in their family life an extension and integration of school life; they acquire from the "atmosphere," as it were, a whole assortment of notions and aptitudes that facilitate their educational progress in the formal sense. Furthermore, a year or so before entering elementary school, they begin to acquire literary language, that is, a means of expression and of thinking superior to that of the average school population between the ages of six and ten. Thus there is a difference between urban and rural schoolchildren: by the very fact of living in a city, a child between the ages of one and six absorbs a wide assortment of notions and aptitudes that make his progress through school easier, more profitable, and faster.

The essential elements, at least, of these conditions must have a place in the organization of the common school. In the meantime, one must assume that the development of the common school would be paralleled by the development of kindergartens: institutions in which, even before the age of six, children would become accustomed to a certain collective discipline and acquire preschool notions and aptitudes. The same will take place at the subsequent stage, if the common school also provides a boarding-school lifestyle, twenty-four hours a day: a school that is freed from the existing forms of hypocritical and mechanical discipline, and one where students receive assistance not only in class but also during periods of individual study, with the better students lending a helping hand, etc.

The fundamental problem arises during that stage in the existing school system that is now represented by the lycée. As a form of instruction, the lycée of today does not differ in the least from the earlier grades, except for the assumption that, as a result of the experience they have already accumulated, the students are more intellectually and morally mature. In fact, however, between the lycée and the university there is a leap, a real break in continuity, and not a normal transition from quantity (age) to quality (intellectual and moral maturity). There is a shift from an almost purely receptive form of learning to creative education, a shift from the school, where the discipline of studying is imposed and controlled from the outside, to a form of education in which [intellectual] self-discipline and moral independence are theoretically unlimited. And this takes place immediately after the crisis of puberty, when the ardor of instinctive and elemental passions is still struggling against the restraints of character and moral conscience. In Italy, moreover, where the "seminar" system is not widespread in the universities, the shift is all the more brutal and mechanical. For this reason, then, the lycée phase of the common school must be conceived as the most important transitory phase, during which the aim of the school is to create the fundamental values of "humanism": the intellectual self-discipline and moral independence needed for subsequent specialization, whether of an intellectual character (university studies) or of a directly practical-productive character (industry, business administration, civil service, etc.). Study of the scientific method must begin at the lycée and no longer be a monopoly of the university; the lycée must already be a fundamental part of creative—and not just receptive—studies. (I make a distinction between creative school and active school: the common school is entirely an active school, whereas the creative school is a phase, the apex of the active school.[2] Naturally, both active school and creative school must be understood correctly. The active school must move past its romantic phase, in which the elements of struggle against the mechanical and Jesuitical school have been morbidly exaggerated for oppositional and polemical reasons; it must discover and arrive at the clas-

sical phase, which is free from spurious polemics and finds within itself and in the goals it wants to attain both its raison d'être and the impulse to come up with its own forms and methods. Thus "creative school" does not mean a school of "inventors and discoverers" of new facts and proofs in an absolute sense; it is, rather, a school in which "reception" occurs through the student's spontaneous and independent effort and in which the teacher functions primarily as an overseer and friendly guide, something that at present happens or should be happening in the universities. To discover a "truth" by oneself, without external suggestions and promptings, is a "creation," even if the truth is an old one; in any case, it is an entry into the intellectual phase in which new truths may be discovered because one has arrived at knowledge and discovered an old "truth" by oneself.) In the lycée, then, the basic learning activity will take place in seminars, libraries, experimental study rooms, laboratories; the basic elements for a professional orientation will be acquired there.

The advent of the common school will bring about a fundamental change in the existing relations between the universities and the academies. Today these two institutions are independent from one another, and the academies (the great academies, naturally) occupy a place that is hierarchically superior to that of the universities. With the arrival of the common school, the academies will have to become the intellectual organization (for intellectual coordination and creativity) of those individuals who on completion of common school do not attend university but get started immediately in a profession. These individuals should not lapse into intellectual passivity; rather, they should have available to them an organism, specialized in all the industrial and intellectual fields, in which they may collaborate and wherein they will find all the necessary means for the creative work they want to undertake. The whole system of academies will be reorganized and revitalized. Territorially, it will have a hierarchy—a national center that will embrace all the great national academies—regional divisions, and urban as well as rural local units. There will be separate specialized sections, all of which will be fully represented at the national and regional centers but only partially represented on the local level. They will be based on the same principles as the cultural institutes of specific social groups. Traditional academic work—that is, the systematization of knowledge (the Italian type of academy in its present form) and the channeling as well as the stabilization, according to a standard [(standard thought)], of intellectual activities (the French type of academy)—will become [only] one aspect of the new organization, which should engage in creative activity and the dissemination of knowledge and have collective authority. It will oversee industrial meetings, lectures and activities related to the scientific organization of labor, experimental factory laboratories, etc., and it will serve as a selective mechanism for

improving the individual abilities of those who are on the periphery. Each local unit of this organization should have a section devoted to ethics and political science, but at the request of interested individuals it could also form a section of applied science to discuss from a cultural viewpoint issues related to industry, agriculture, and the organization and rationalization of labor in the factory, in farming, and in the bureaucracy. Periodic congresses, to which representatives are elected, will bring the most capable individuals to the attention of directors in the higher echelons, etc. In the regional divisions and at the center, all the different activities should be represented, with laboratories, libraries, etc. Official contacts among the various levels will be maintained by lecturers and overseers. The regional divisions and the center (which may be a replica of the Collège de France in its present form) should periodically invite representatives from the subordinate units to present academic reports; they should also organize competitions and establish prizes (scholarships at home and abroad). It would be useful to have a comprehensive list of all existing academies and of the prevalent themes treated in their published proceedings (for the most part, these are cemeteries of culture).

This organization should collaborate very closely with the universities and with the advanced specialized schools of other branches (military, naval, etc.). With this organization, culture will be centralized and given an impetus of unprecedented proportions across the entire nation. It is possible to start by having the national center and local units with a few sections.

The plan sketched here is meant only as a basic outline of a program that can be pursued gradually. Therefore, this plan must be integrated with the indispensable transitional measures that need to be taken. In any case, the transitional measures, too, should be conceived in the general spirit of this outline, so that the transitional institutions could be absorbed gradually into the basic plan without disruption and crises.

Cf. Notebook 12, §1.

§<51>. *Brains and brawn.* The distinction of the categories of intellectuals from other categories refers to their social function and their professional activity; in other words, it takes into account the fact that mental effort[a] rather than muscular (nervous) effort preponderates most heavily in professional activity. Yet, of course, the relation between the mental and the muscular is not always the same; hence there are different levels of intellectual activity. It must also be recognized that no occupation is ever totally devoid of some kind of intellectual activity, and, finally, that, apart

[a]In the manuscript, Gramsci inserted "activity" between the lines, above "effort."

interesting. Suppose the pope had to resort to this political expedient in order to exert pressure on the state: would it not give rise immediately to the problem of returning the sums of money already received (monies associated specifically with the treaty, not the concordat)?[13] But these sums of money are huge, and, one imagines, they would mostly have been spent during the first few years; therefore their restitution may be regarded as practically impossible. No state—and much less a private entity or a bank—would make such a big loan to the pope just to get him out of an awkward situation. Renunciation of the treaty would unleash such a great crisis in the practical organization of the church that its solvency would be wiped out, albeit in the long run. The financial agreement must therefore be considered as the essential part of the treaty, as the guarantee that makes the possibility of renouncing the treaty—raised for polemical reasons and to exert political pressure—virtually nil.

Cf. Notebook 16, §11.

§<54>. *1918*. "In 1918 there was an important innovation in our law, an innovation that, strangely (but there was censorship in 1918), went generally unnoticed: the state resumed subsidizing the Catholic religion, abandoning the sixty-three-year-old principle of Cavour that had been laid down on the basis of the Sardinian law of 29 May 1855: the state must not subsidize any religion." A. C. Jemolo, "Religione dello Stato e confessioni ammesse," in *Nuovi Studi di Diritto, Economia, Politica*, 1930, p. 30.

The innovation was introduced with the L<aw>. D<ecrees>. of 17 March 1918, n. 396, and 9 May 1918, n. 655. On this topic, Jemolo refers to the note in D. Schiappoli, *I recenti provvedimenti economici a vantaggio del clero* (Naples, 1922), extracted from vol. XLVIII of the *Atti della R. Accademia di Scienze morali e politiche di Napoli*.[1]

Cf. Notebook 16, §11.

§<55>. *The educational principle in elementary and secondary school.* The official introduction of a split in the educational principle separating elementary and secondary school from high school.[1] Previously, a very marked division of this kind existed only between vocational school on the one hand and secondary school and high school on the other. Elementary school was placed in a kind of limbo, because of some of its particular characteristics.

In elementary school there used to be two elements that contributed to the *education* of children: the notions of science and the citizen's right and

duties. "Science" was meant to introduce the child into the *societas rerum*; the rights and duties were meant to introduce him into the "society of men." "Science" clashed with the "magical" conception of the world and of nature that the child absorbs from an environment "imbued" with folklore. Education is a struggle against folklore, in favor of a realistic view that combines two elements: the concept of a law of nature and the concept of active human participation in the life of nature, that is, active participation in the transformation of nature with a purpose, which is the social life of humans. In other words, this conception consolidates itself in work that is based on objective and accurate knowledge of the laws of nature for the purpose of creating human society. In the final analysis, elementary education hinges on the concept and the reality of work, because it is work that grafts the social order (the ensemble of rights and duties) onto the natural order. The concept of equilibrium between the social order and the natural order based on work, on human practical activity, produces the *elementary* view of the world free from all magic and sorcery and provides the ground for the subsequent development of a *historical* conception of the world seen *in constant movement*. It is not entirely true that "instruction" differs from education; the excessive insistence on this distinction has been a serious error and its consequences will become evident.[2] Instruction is quite different from education only if one assumes that the learner is merely passive, which is not only absurd in itself but also denied by the very same fervent supporters of pure education who oppose mere mechanical instruction. The truth is that the instruction-education nexus is enacted by the living work of the teacher, insofar as schooling is the acceleration and disciplining of the child's formation. If the teaching corps is inept, its work would be all the more inept if it were forced to provide education: it will create a superficial, rhetorical school. This is even more evident in the literature and philosophy courses at the secondary level. Previously, students at least left school with a certain baggage of concrete historical notions; now that the teacher is expected to be a philosopher and an aesthete, students ignore concrete notions and fill their heads with meaningless words that are promptly forgotten. The battle against the old school system was justified, but the problem had more to do with people than with programs. In reality, a mediocre teacher may succeed in making his students become better *informed*; he will never be able to make them better educated. He will go through the *mechanical* part of the lessons scrupulously and conscientiously, and if the students have active minds, they will put the "baggage" in order on their own. With the new programs, which coincide with a lowering of standards in the teaching corps, there will be no "baggage," and there will be nothing to put in order. The new programs should have abolished examinations entirely: to sit for an examination now must be a terribly greater "gamble" than

before. Somehow or other, a date is always a date, whoever the examiner might be, and a definition is always a definition. But a judgment? An aesthetic or philosophical analysis?

In my view, the [educational] efficacy of the old Italian secondary school, based on the old Casati law,[3] depended on the totality of its structuration and its programs, rather than on some express wish to be an "educative" school system. On this issue, I believe, one can repeat what Carducci said about the language question: instead of speaking, Italians watch their tongue.[4] One can see how this applies to the school, if one thinks of the activity of the student. The more the new programs—among the theoreticians who planned them and defend them—affirm and theorize the student's activity and his active collaboration with the teacher, the more they actually operate as if the student were merely passive. In the old school, then, the organizational structure itself provided an education. How? The study of Latin and Greek and other languages, together with the study of their respective literatures and political histories, was at the basis of this mode of education. Its educative character came from the fact that these things were not learned for an immediate practical-professional purpose; they did indeed have a purpose, but it was the cultural formation of man—and it cannot be denied that this purpose is an "interest." However, the studying in itself appears to be disinterested. One doesn't learn Latin and Greek in order to speak them, to become a waiter, or an interpreter, or whatever. One learns them in order to know the civilizations of Greece and Rome, whose existence is posited as a foundation of world culture. Latin or Greek is learned by way of grammar, somewhat mechanically; but the charges of mechanistic aridity are greatly exaggerated. This issue concerns children; they should be made to acquire certain habits of diligence, precision, physical composure, mental concentration on particular objects. Would a thirty- or forty-year-old scholar be able to sit at a desk for sixteen hours on end if, as a child, he had not acquired "compulsorily," through "mechanical coercion," the appropriate psychophysical habits?[5] This is where one has to start if one also wants to bring up scholars, and pressure must be applied across the board in order to produce those thousands, or hundreds, or just dozens of first-rate scholars that every civilization requires. (Certainly, there is much that can be improved, but on this basis.)

Latin is learned, and it is analyzed down to its smallest basic units; it is analyzed as a dead thing. This is true, but every analysis carried out by a child is bound to be an analysis of a dead thing. Besides, one must not forget that wherever Latin is studied in these ways, the life of the Romans is a myth that, to a certain extent, has already interested and still interests the child. The language is dead, it is dissected like a cadaver, it is true, but the cadaver comes back to life continually in the examples and the stories. Could one do the same thing with Italian? Impossible. No living language

could be studied in the same way as Latin: it would be or *would seem* absurd. No child knows Latin when he starts to study it with this kind of analytic method. A living language could be known, and it would take just one child who knows it to break the spell: everybody would rush to the Berlitz school. Latin and Greek appear to the imagination like a myth, even for the teacher. One does not study Latin in order to learn Latin; it is studied in order to accustom children to studying, to analyzing a body of history that can be treated as a cadaver but returns continually to life. In the eight years of Latin, the entire language is studied, from Phaedrus, to Ennius, to Lactantius: a historical phenomenon is analyzed from its beginnings to its death in time. One studies the grammar of a certain time, the vocabulary of a given period and of a specific author, and then one discovers that Phaedrus' grammar is not the same as Cicero's, nor is it the same as Plautus', etc., and that the same combination of sounds does not have the same meaning in different periods and in different authors. Latin and Italian are always being compared, but each word is a concept, a figure of speech that takes on various shades of meaning in different periods, in different individuals, and in the two languages under comparison. One studies the history of literature, the history of the books written in that language, the political history, the exploits of the men who spoke that language. The education of the young man is determined by this organic whole, by the fact that he has followed—even if only roughly—that whole itinerary with its various stages, etc., etc. This mode of study *educated* without expressly declaring that it aimed to do so and with minimal intervention on the part of the teacher. Logical, psychological, artistic, etc., experiences were gained unreflectively, but what was gained above all was a great experience of history, of historical development.

Naturally, I do not believe that Greek and Latin have intrinsic thaumaturgical qualities; I am saying that in a given milieu, in a given culture with a given tradition, studying along these lines produced these particular results. Latin and Greek can be replaced, and they will be replaced, but one must be able to deploy the new subject or set of subjects didactically, in such a way as to obtain equivalent results in the general education of the individual from his childhood years to the time he is old enough to choose a career. During this span of time, the course of study, or most of it, must be disinterested; in other words, it must not have immediate or much too immediate practical purposes: it must be formative while being "instructive," that is, rich in concrete information.

In the modern school, I believe, a process of continuing degeneration is taking place: the vocational school, which addresses immediate practical interests, is gaining the upper hand over the "formative" school, which does not have an immediate interest. The greatest paradox is that this type of school appears and is proclaimed to be "democratic," while in fact it is

really designed to perpetuate social differences. How does one explain this paradox? I believe that it stems from an error in historical perspective that confuses quality with quantity. The traditional school was "oligarchic" because it was attended only by children of the upper class who were destined to become rulers, but it was not its mode of teaching that made it "oligarchic." It is not its students' acquisition of leadership skills nor its propensity to form superior individuals that gives a particular type of school its social character. The social character of the school is determined by the fact that every social stratum has its own type of school designed to perpetuate a specific traditional function within that stratum. In order to break this pattern, then, one must not multiply and promote vocational types of school but rather create a unified type of preparatory (elementary-secondary) school that would guide the youngster to the threshold of choosing a career and, in the process, form him as a person capable of thinking, studying, and ruling—or controlling those who rule. The multiplication of types of vocational school, then, tends to perpetuate traditional distinctions, but since it also tends to create new stratifications within these distinctions, it gives the impression of aiming for democracy. Take, for example, the unskilled laborer and the skilled worker, or the peasant and the surveyor or the petty agronomist, etc. But the trend toward democracy, in essence, cannot mean merely that an unskilled laborer can become a skilled worker but rather that every "citizen" can acquire the ability to "govern" and that society places him, even if only "abstractly," in general conditions to make this possible. "Political democracy" aims at removing the difference between those who govern and those who are governed, by ensuring that all those who are governed acquire, more or less gratis, the general "technical" preparation that is needed. But in reality the type of school that now, in practice, predominates demonstrates that this is just a rhetorical illusion. School is being organized increasingly in such a way as to restrict the base of the governing class in possession of technical preparation—a general historical-critical preparation, that is.

Dogmatism and critical history in the elementary and secondary school: the new pedagogy has chosen to attack dogmatism in the schools by focusing on the field of "instruction," in other words, on the learning of concrete information. It has chosen to attack precisely that field in which a certain dogmatism is practically indispensable, a dogmatism that can be absorbed and loosened only in the course of the whole cycle of the program of study (one cannot teach historical grammar in the first year of high school). Yet the new pedagogy has been forced to put up with the introduction of dogmatism par excellence in the field of religious thought and to see the entire history of philosophy described as a succession of wild ideas and delusions.[6]

The teaching of philosophy: I believe that in the secondary school the new method impoverishes learning and, in practice, lowers its level. (Rationally, the new method is very fine and proper, but in practice, given the condition of the schools, it is just a very rational and attractive utopia.) Traditional "descriptive" philosophy, reinforced by a course in the history of philosophy and by the reading, at home, of certain authors, seems to me to be the best thing. But "descriptive and definitional" philosophy, they say, is an abstraction! It may be an abstraction, just like grammar and mathematics, but it is necessary. One equals one is an abstraction, but nobody is led to think that one fly equals one elephant. The instruments of logic, too, are abstractions of the same kind; they are like the grammar of normal thought: they are not innate but acquired historically. The new method *presupposes* possession of the instruments of formal logic; its goal, however, is the education of children who cannot possibly be thought to have already acquired these instruments, thus the new method in effect regards the instruments as innate. Formal logic is like grammar: it is assimilated in a "living" way, even though it is necessarily apprehended schematically. The student is not a gramophone record, a passive receptacle. For example, the child who toils over Barbara, Bàràlipton, etc.:[7] he performs a strenuous task, to be sure, and ways should be found to ensure that he doesn't have to work any harder than is absolutely necessary. It is equally true, however, that he will always have to work hard in order to learn and force himself to control his physical movements; in other words, he has to go through a psychophysical apprenticeship. Studying, too, is a job and a very tiring one, with its own special apprenticeship, not only of the intellect but of the muscular-nervous system as well. It is a process of adaptation, a habit acquired with effort, pain, and tedium. The growth of mass participation in secondary education tends to slacken the discipline of studying; it tends to call for an "easing off." Many even consider the difficulty of study artificial since they are accustomed to think that only manual labor is hard and strenuous work. It is a complex issue. Undoubtedly, the child of a traditionally intellectual family gets through the process of psychophysical adaptation more easily: even as he enters the classroom for the first time, he already has numerous advantages over the other students; he has already learned from his family traditions how to fit in. Similarly, the son of a city worker suffers less when he starts working in a factory than does a peasant's son or a peasant already formed by life in the fields. Even diet has its importance, etc., etc.

This is why many "common people" think the difficulty of study entails some "trick" at their expense. They see the gentleman (for many, especially in the rural areas, "gentleman"[8] means "intellectual") complete, smoothly and with apparent ease, work that costs their sons tears

and blood, and they think there is a "trick." In a new political situation these problems will become very severe, and it will be necessary to resist the tendency to render easy that which cannot become easy without being perverted. If the goal is to produce a new corps of intellectuals, going all the way up to the highest levels, from a social stratum that has not traditionally developed the suitable psychophysical aptitudes, it will be necessary to overcome difficulties of unprecedented proportions.

Cf. Notebook 12, §2.

§<56>. *Machiavelli and the "autonomy" of the phenomenon of politics.* The question of Machiavellianism and anti-Machiavellianism (every true "Machiavellian" begins his political activity with an ostensible refutation of Machiavelli's theories: e.g., the Jesuits and Frederick II of Prussia).[1] The importance of the question of Machiavellianism in the development of political science: in Italy, at least, political science has developed around this theme. Construct a critical bibliography on the topic. What is the significance of Croce's comprehensive demonstration of the autonomy of the political-economic moment? Can one say that Croce would not have arrived at this conclusion were it not for the cultural influence of Marxism and historical materialism? Remember that at one point (check) Croce says he is surprised that no one has ever thought of saying that Marx replicated Machiavelli's accomplishment for a particular modern class.[2] Can one deduce from this passing statement by Croce the unfairness of his reduction of historical materialism to a mere empirical canon of historical methodology?

Other questions: given that politics is autonomous, what kind of dialectical relationship is there between it and the other historical manifestations? Problem of the dialectic in Croce and his postulation of a "dialectic of distincts":[3] is it not a contradiction in terms, an *ignorantia elenchi*? Dialectic should only refer to opposites, negation of the negation, not to an "implicated" relation.

Art, morality, philosophy "serve" politics; that is, they are "implicated" in politics, they may be reduced to a moment of it but not vice versa: politics destroys art, philosophy, morality. Along these lines, it is possible to affirm the priority of the politico-economic fact—that is, the "structure"—as a point of reference and as a nonmechanical dialectical "causation" of the superstructures.

In Croce's philosophy, the point on which one must focus, it seems to me, is precisely the so-called dialectic of distincts: this postulation is really needed, but it is also a contradiction in terms. It is necessary to study these principles in order to develop them critically. Examine the

never been an intellectual and moral reform involving the popular masses. The Renaissance, eighteenth-century French philosophy, nineteenth-century German philosophy: these are reforms that touch only the upper classes and often only the intellectuals. Modern idealism, in its Crocean form, is certainly a reform, and it has had a certain efficacy, but it has not touched significant masses of people, and it fell apart at the first counterattack. Therefore historical mat.<erialism> will have or may have this function, which is not only totalitarian as a conception of the world but also in that it will permeate all of society down to its deepest roots.[1] Recall the polemics (Gobetti, Missiroli, etc.) on the need for a reform, understood mechanically.[2]

§<76>. *Vittorio Macchioro and America.* Vittorio Macchioro has written a book, *Roma capta: Saggio intorno alla religione romana* (Messina: Casa Ed. G. Principato), in which the whole argument is based on "the poverty of imagination of the Roman people."[1] In 1930 he went to America and sent some reports to *Il Mattino* of Naples. And behold! the motif appears in his first report (of 7 March): "The American has no imagination, he is unable to create images. I believe that, but for the influence of Europe [(!)], there will never be a great American poet or painter. The American mentality is essentially practical and technical: whence a special feeling for quantity, that is, for numbers. Just as the poet is sensitive to images, or the musician is sensitive to sound, so the American is sensitive to numbers. —This propensity to conceive of life as a technical fact explains American philosophy itself. Pragmatism emanates precisely from this mentality, which does not value or grasp abstraction. James and Dewey, even more, are the most genuine products of this unconscious technical urge; for them, philosophy is replaced by education, and an abstract idea is not valuable in itself but only to the extent that it can be translated into action. ('The poverty of imagination of the Roman people induced the Romans to think of the godhead as an abstract energy that manifests itself only in action'; cf. *Roma capta*.) For this reason America is the typical country of churches and schools, where theoretics are grafted onto life." (Cf. *L'Italia Letteraria* of 16 March 1930.)[2]

It seems that Macchioro's thesis is a cap that fits all heads.

§<3>. *Owen, Saint-Simon, and Ferrante Aporti's infant schools*. It is clear from the article "La questione delle scuole infantili e dell'abate Aporti secondo nuovi documenti" (*La Civiltà Cattolica* of 4 August 1928)[1] that in 1836 the Jesuits and the Vatican opposed the opening, in Bologna, of infant schools of the type advocated by F. Aporti[2] because the schools were supported by, among others, "a certain Doctor Rossi," "reputed to be a promoter of Saint-Simonism, which at the time was making a lot of noise in France and was greatly, perhaps excessively, feared even in Italy" (p. 221). The archbishop of Bologna, drawing the attention of the Holy See to the propaganda and pamphlets that were being distributed in support of the infant schools, wrote that "in itself this could be a good institution but that he was very fearful of certain persons at the head of the enterprise and of the great zeal they exhibit . . . that these schools were conceived by a certain Robert Owen, a Protestant, as has been pointed out by Prof. Lambruschini[3] in *Guida dell'Educatore*, which is printed in Florence, no. 2, February 1836, p. 66" (p. 224).

In February 1837 the consultant to the Holy See, Cornelius Everboeck, a Jesuit, delivered his opinion on the infant schools to the officer of the Holy See. It is a study of forty-eight large and densely written pages. It starts by examining the theory and method of the Saint-Simonians and it arrives at the conclusion that the method of the new schools is—or, at least, is very strongly suspected of being—infected by the theories and principles of pantheism and Saint-Simonism. It recommends that the schools be condemned and proposes an encyclical against the Saint-Simonian sect and its theories (p. 227). The author of the *Civiltà Cattolica* article says that the first part of the opinion, which attacks Saint-Simonism in general as a theory, shows "the consultant's studiousness and erudition." However, he does admit that the second part, which was supposed to demonstrate that Saint-Simonism had infiltrated the new types of school, is much shorter and weaker, "obviously influenced and, in part, misled by the information and the conviction" of the informants from Bologna, who perceived and denounced the methods, the spirit, or the danger of French Saint-Simonism in the new schools. The Congregation of the Holy Office did not insist on the danger of Saint-Simonism but banned pamphlets and schools associated with its methods. Four more consultants recommended an encyclical against Saint-Simonism.

doubts in their mind: whether the Gospels are really to be believed, whether the Christian religion is obligatory for the whole world, and whether one can know with certainty what Christ's doctrine really was. Therefore, they are hesitant to admit that Jesus Christ is truly God."[3] And again: "The greatest of all [the difficulties for the return of the English to the Roman Church]: every Englishman's love of independence. He does not accept any interference, least of all in religion or by a foreigner. Inbred in him, deep-set in his subconscious mind, is the instinct that national independence and religious independence go hand in hand. England, he maintains, will never accept an Italian-governed church."[4]

§<23>. *Past and present. The Catholics after the concordat.* The pope's response to the Christmas greetings of the College of Cardinals is very important; it is published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 4 January 1930.[1] The *Civiltà Cattolica* of 18 January published the papal encyclical *Quinquagesimo ante anno* (marking Pius XI's fiftieth year as a priest), which reiterates that the treaty and the concordat are indivisible and inseparable; "either both hold good or both perish."[2] This assertion, repeated by the pope, is of great significance: perhaps it is stated and stressed not only with respect to the Italian government with which the two pacts were concluded but especially as a safeguard in case there is a change of government. The difficulty resides in the fact that if the treaty collapsed, the pope would have to reimburse the sums of money received in the interim from the Italian state under the treaty agreement; nor would the possible cavil based on the Law of Guarantees have any merit.[3] One needs to examine how on earth the sum of money that the state had allotted to the Vatican after the Guarantee Act was accounted for in the budget, for there was a provision that the state would be freed from its obligation if within five years of the enactment of the law the Vatican were to refuse receipt of the money.

§<24>. *Encyclopedic notions. Civil society.* One must distinguish civil society as Hegel understands it and in the sense it is often used in these notes (that is, in the sense of the political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the whole of society; as the ethical content of the state) from the sense given to it by Catholics, for whom civil society is, instead, political society or the state,

as opposed to the society of the family and of the church. In his encyclical on education (*Civiltà Cattolica*, 1 February 1930),[1] Pius XI states:

> Now there are three *necessary* societies, distinct from one another and yet harmoniously combined by God, into which man is born: two, namely the family and civil society, belong to the natural order; the third, the Church, to the supernatural order. In the first place comes the family, instituted directly by God for its peculiar purpose, the generation and formation of offspring; for this reason it has priority of nature and therefore of rights over civil society. Nevertheless, the family is an imperfect society, since it has not in itself all the means for its own complete development; whereas civil society is a perfect society, having in itself all the means for its peculiar end, which is the temporal well-being of the community; and so, in this respect, that is, in view of the common good, it has pre-eminence over the family, which finds its own suitable temporal perfection precisely in civil society. The third society, into which man is born when through Baptism he reaches the divine life of grace, is the Church; a society of the supernatural order and of universal extent; a perfect society, because it has in itself all the means required for its own end, which is the eternal salvation of mankind; hence it is supreme in its domain.[2]

For Catholicism, what is called "civil society" in Hegelian language is not "necessary"; that is, it is purely historical or contingent. In the Catholic conception, the state is just the church, and it is a universal and supernatural state: the medieval conception is fully preserved in theory.

§<25>. *Past and present.* The pope's encyclical on education (published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 1 February 1930):[1] discussions it has stirred up, problems it has posed in theory and in practice. (This is a part of the larger issue concerning schooling, or the educational aspect of the national problem of culture or the struggle for culture.)

§<26>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Pirandello.* Pirandello does not, by any means, belong in this category of writers. I put him here in order to group together the notes on literary culture. A special essay will have to be written on Pirandello, using all the notes

error is basically the same, *pantheism* is different in its manner of conception and expression; it imagines the world as an absolute being, an object of religious worship: "everything is God." *Theopanism*, on the other hand, conceives of God as the true-spiritual reality from which all things emanate: "God becomes everything," necessarily, incessantly, without beginning and without end. Theopanism is (alongside a few dualistic systems) the most common way in which Hindu philosophy conceives of God and the world.[1]

§<179>. *Past and present. The vocational school.* In November 1931 there was an extensive parliamentary debate on vocational education; it brought into relief, in a quite lucid and organic manner, all the theoretical and practical elements needed for a study of the problem.[1] Three types of school: (1) vocational, (2) middle technical, (3) classical. The first for workers and peasants, the second for the petty bourgeoisie, the third for the ruling class.

The dispute revolved around the issue of whether the vocational schools should be strictly practical and an end in themselves—so that they would not provide for the possibility of moving on either to the classical school or even to technical school. The broad-based position was that allowance had to be made for the possibility of moving on to technical school (moving on to the classical school was excluded a priori by everyone). (The problem is linked to the structure of the military: can a private become a noncommissioned officer? And, if a private can become a noncommissioned officer, can he become a subaltern officer, etc.? The same is true, generally, of any personnel structure, as in the civil service, etc.)

It would be interesting to reconstruct the history of vocational and technical schools in parliamentary debates and the discussions of the principal municipal councils, given that some of the major vocational schools were established by local governments or by private bequests that are administered, controlled, or budgeted by local councils. The study of vocational schools goes hand in hand with an awareness of the needs of production and its growth. Vocational schools for agriculture: a very important matter; many private initiatives (recall the Faina schools in the Abruzzo region and in Central Italy).[2] Specialized agricultural schools (for viniculture, etc.). Schools of agriculture for landholders of small and medium-sized properties; in other words, schools that produce people who

are capable of heading and managing farming businesses. Has there been a professional type of agricultural school aimed at creating specialized agricultural workers?

§<180>. *Encyclopedic notions. "Scientific." What is "scientific"?* The ambiguity surrounding the terms "science" and "scientific" stems from the fact that they have acquired their meaning from one particular segment of the whole range of fields of human knowledge, specifically, from the natural and physical sciences. The description "scientific" was applied to any method that resembled the method of inquiry and research of the natural sciences, which had become the sciences par excellence, the fetish sciences. There are no such things as sciences par excellence, nor is there any such thing as a method par excellence, a "method in itself." Each type of scientific research creates a method that is suitable to it, creates its own logic, which is general and universal only in its "conformity with the end." The most generic and universal methodology is nothing other than formal or mathematical logic, that is, the ensemble of those abstract mechanisms of thought that have been discovered over time, clarified, and refined in the course of the history of philosophy and culture. This abstract methodology—namely, formal logic—is scorned for misguided reasons by idealist philosophers. The study of this abstract methodology is analogous to the study of grammar; in other words, not only does it go hand in hand with probing deeper into the past experiences of the methodology of thought (the technique of thought) and the absorption of past knowledge, but it is a condition for the further development of knowledge itself.

Examine the reasons why formal "logic" has become increasingly a discipline linked to the mathematical sciences—Russell in England, Peano in Italy[1]—right up to the point of being elevated, as in Russell's case, to the pretension of being the "only true philosophy." One could start with Engels's assertion that "scientific" is the opposite of "utopian."[2] Does the subtitle of Turati's *Critica Sociale* have the same meaning as in Engels? Certainly not. By "scientific," Turati means something close to "the method of the physical sciences" (the subtitle disappeared at a certain point; check when—certainly before 1917), and, even so, it is meant in a very generic and tendentious sense.[3]

§<205>. *Encyclopedic notions. Direct action.* Various meanings, depending on the political and ideological tendencies. The meaning attached to the term by the "individualists" and the "economists,"[1] with other meanings in between. The meaning attached to the term by the "economists" or syndicalists of diverse tendencies (reformists, etc.) is what unleashed a whole range of meanings, including that of pure "criminals."[2]

§<206>. *Educational issues.* Cf. Metron's article "Il facile e il difficile," in the *Corriere della Sera* of 7 January 1932.[1] Metron makes two interesting observations (pertaining to engineering courses and the state examinations for engineers): (1) that of a hundred things the instructor says in a course, the student absorbs one or two; (2) that in the state exams students are able to answer the "difficult" questions but are stymied by the "easy" questions. Metron, however, does not thoroughly analyze the reasons for these two problems, and he does not suggest any "purposeful" remedy. It seems to me that the two shortcomings are linked to the scholastic system of lecture lessons with no "seminars" and to the traditional nature of examinations. Notes and handouts. The notes and handouts deal primarily with "difficult" questions; the teaching itself dwells on what is difficult on the assumption that the student will handle the "easy things" on his own. As the exams approach, more time is spent recapitulating the material covered in the course, until the eve of the exam, when only the most difficult questions are reviewed. The student is, as it were, mesmerized by what is difficult; all his mnemonic prowess and intellectual acuity are focused on the difficult problems, etc. As for the low level of absorption: the system of lecture lessons discourages the teacher from repeating himself or from repeating himself any more than is absolutely necessary. As a result, the problems are presented only within a specific framework that makes them one dimensional for the student. The student absorbs only one or two things out of the hundred things the teachers says, but if what the teacher passes on consists of a hundred one-dimensional items, then it is inevitable that the student absorbs very little. A university course is conceived like a book on a topic: but can one become cultured through the reading of just one book? What we are dealing with, then, is the question of the method of teaching at the university: does one attend university *to study* or *to study in order to know how to study*? Should one study "facts" or

the method for studying the "facts"? The "seminar" format in fact is meant to complement oral teaching and invigorate it.

§<207>. *Popular literature. Guerin Meschino.* The *Corriere della Sera* of 7 January 1932 published an article signed Radius under the headline "I classici del popolo" and the subtitle "Guerino detto il Meschino."[1] The headline is vague and ambiguous. *Guerino*, together with a whole list of similar books (*I Reali di Francia*, *Bertoldo*,[2] tales of bandits, knights, etc.), typifies a particular kind of popular literature: the most rudimentary and primitive type of literature that circulates among the most backward and "isolated" strata of the population, especially those in the south, in the mountains, etc. Those who read *Guerino* do not read Dumas or *Les Misérables*, much less Sherlock Holmes. There is a specific kind of folklore, a particular type of "common sense" that corresponds to these strata.

Radius has only thumbed through the book, and he's not exactly a philologist. His interpretation of *Meschino* is bizarre: "the hero was tacked with the nickname because of his very humble pedigree." This is a colossal error that alters entirely the popular psychology of the book and distorts the psychological-emotional affinity of the popular readers with the book. It is immediately obvious that Guerino is of royal blood, but his misfortune compelled him to become a "servant," that is to say, "meschino" in the sense of the word as it was used in the Middle Ages and also in Dante (in the *Vita Nuova*, I remember perfectly well).[3] So, Guerino is the son of a king, reduced to bondage, and he regains his natural rank through his own abilities and determination. Among the most primitive "people," there is this traditional high regard for those of noble lineage; the high regard changes to "affection" when misfortune strikes the hero, and that, in turn, gives way to enthusiasm when the hero defies misfortune and regains his social position.

Guerino as an "Italian" popular poem: from this perspective, one should note how coarse and dull the book is; in other words, it has not been elaborated or polished in any way, due to the cultural isolation of the people, left to themselves. This may help explain why there are no love affairs in *Guerino* and why it is utterly devoid of eroticism.

Guerino as "popular encyclopedia": consider how low the level of culture of those strata who read *Guerino* must be; how little

that the apostolic letter [that has been translated] declaring Bellarmine a doctor (see the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 7 November 1931), talks of the Compagnia in general and calls Bellarmine "a true companion of Jesus."[2] Why "companion" rather than "soldier," which should be the accurate appellation? Is the name "Compagnia" just a translation of "Societas"; does it not have a military connotation? The Latin word "*societas*" cannot have a military meaning, but what was Ignatius of Loyola's intention? (Remember Bellarmine's connection with the trial of Galileo.) The *Civiltà Cattolica* article-comment on the "Apostolic Letter" mentions the fact that Bellarmine's "cause" (for beatification and canonization) had been held up by the "plotting and the threats [!] of those misguided politicians and adversaries of the papacy, some of them supporters of absolute monarchy ["the integralists"], others supporters of demagogic subversion ["the modernists"]."[3] The *Civiltà Cattolica* touches on eighteenth-century events, but then it speaks of "their wretched successors and present-day imitators."[4] (It appears that in the eighteenth century, Bellarmine's beatification was a factor in the struggle that led to the suppression of the Jesuits by order of the Bourbons.)

The Jesuits today regard the canonization of Bellarmine and his designation as "doctor" as a form of revenge (even though the last papal action coincided with the suppression of the Jesuits in Spain), but they are cautious: "Certainly, no one wishes to overestimate this event or to exaggerate its importance, significance, purposefulness, or 'timeliness' with respect to the present moment or, even more, with respect to the extraordinary storm—not only unexpected but unforeseeable—that erupted when the decree to declare Bellarmine a doctor was first deliberated and then discussed," etc.[5]

§<89>. *Past and present. Religion in the schools*.

This is why, following the Gentile reform,[1] the new school curricula assign art and religion solely to elementary school, whereas philosophy is entrusted for the most part to secondary school. In the philosophical rationale of the elementary curricula, the words "the teaching of religion is considered to be the foundation and the summit of all primary education" mean precisely that religion is a necessary but lower category that education must pass through because, according to Hegel's notion, religion is a mythological and lower form of philosophy that corresponds

to the mental capacity of the child, who is not yet capable of rising to the level of pure philosophy—into which, at a later stage, religion must be absorbed and resolved. Let us point out straight away that in fact this idealist theory has failed to pollute the teaching of religion in the elementary school by having it treated as mythology. It has failed *because the teachers either do not understand or they do not care for such theories* and also because the Catholic teaching of religion is intrinsically historical and dogmatic and *the curricula, texts and teachings, are externally supervised and directed by the church.* Furthermore, the words "foundation and summit" have been accepted by the church in their obvious meaning and repeated in the concordat between the Holy See and Italy,[2] according to which (art. 36) religious instruction is extended to the middle schools. This extension is now thwarting the aims of idealism, which wanted to exclude religion from the middle schools, where philosophy alone would predominate—a philosophy destined to supersede and absorb the religion learned in the elementary schools.

Civiltà Cattolica, 7 November 1931. ("Il buono e il cattivo nella pedagogia nuova," unsigned, but by Father Mario Barbera.)[3]

§<90>. *Past and present. State and parties.* By looking at the internal development of the parties, one can evaluate their hegemonic role or political leadership. If the state represents the coercive and punitive force of a country's juridical order, the parties—representing the spontaneous adherence of an elite to such regulation, considered as a type of collective society that the entire mass must be educated to adhere to—must show in their specific interior life that they have assimilated as principles of moral conduct those rules that in the state are legal obligations. Within the parties, necessity has already become freedom; herein lies the source of the enormous political value (that is, the value of political leadership) of the internal discipline of a party and hence the value of such discipline as a yardstick for assessing the potential for growth of the various parties. From this point of view, the parties can be seen as schools of state life. Components of party life: character (resistance to the urges of superseded cultures), honor (fearless will in upholding the new type of culture and life), dignity (awareness of striving for a higher goal), etc.

§<91>. *Past and present. Postwar tendencies in the external organization of human productive factors.* It seems to me that the

§<199>. *Unity of theory and practice.* Research, study, and critique the various forms in which the concept of the unity of theory and practice has been presented in the history of ideas. "Intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus" [by St. Thomas]: theory by simple extension becomes practice—an affirmation of the necessary connection between the order of ideas and the order of facts that is found in Aristotelian philosophy and in scholasticism.[1] Likewise, the other aphorism [on science (by Leibniz) that is quoted as]: "quo magis speculativa magis practica."[2] Vico's proposition "verum ipsum factum,"[3] which Croce develops in the idealistic sense, namely, that knowing is doing and that one knows that which one does (cf. Croce's book on Vico and other polemical writings by Croce).[4] Historical materialism is certainly indebted to this concept (as originally found in Hegel and not in its Crocean derivation).

Cf. Notebook 11, §54.

§<200>. *Antonio Labriola.* In order to compose a thorough study on Antonio Labriola,[1] one needs to take into account, among other things, the bits and pieces of conversations that have been reported by his friends and students. A number of them can be found scattered in Croce's books. For example, in *Conversazioni Critiche* (Second Series), pp. 60–61: "'How would you go about the moral education of a Papuan?' one of our fellow students asked Prof. Labriola years ago during one his lectures on pedagogy; the student was arguing against the effectiveness of pedagogy. The Herbartian professor replied,[2] with the harshness of a Vico or a Hegel: 'Provisionally, I would make him a slave, and that would be the pedagogy in his case; but then I'd want to see whether it would be possible to start using something of our pedagogy with his grandsons and great-grandsons.'"[3] This reply of Labriola's should be compared to the interview he gave on the colonial question (Libya) around 1903 that was published in the volume *Scritti vari di filosofia e politica.*[4] It could also be compared to Gentile's way of thinking in organizing the reform of education that brought religion into the primary schools, etc.[5] What we are dealing with here, it seems to me, is a form of pseudohistoricism, a mechanical and rather empiricist way of thinking. One might recall what Spaventa said about those who do not want men ever to leave the cradle (that is, ever to get out from under the sway of authority, which, however, also educates immature peoples to liberty) and who regard the whole of life (of other people's lives) as a cradle.[6] It seems to me that historically the problem should be formulated differently, that is: whether a nation or social group that has reached a higher level of civilization can (and therefore should) "accelerate" the civil education of the more backward nations and social groups, universalizing its own experience. In short, it seems to me that the

mode of thinking encapsulated in Labriola's reply is not dialectical or progressive but somewhat reactionary. The introduction of religion in the elementary schools in fact goes hand in hand with the notion that "religion is good for the people" (people = child = backward stage of history that corresponds to religion, etc.)—which means renouncing the education of the people. This kind of historicism is well known: it is the historicism of the jurists, for whom the knout is not a knout when it is a "historical knout."[7] Furthermore, this is very nebulous and confused thinking. The fact that a "dogmatic" exposition of scientific notions may be necessary in the elementary schools does not mean that dogma should also be taken to connote "religious" dogma. The fact that a backward people or group may need a coercive "external" discipline of a military kind in order to be educated in the ways of civilization does not mean that they should be reduced to slavery—unless one thinks that the state is always "slavery," even for the class of which it is an expression, etc. The concept of a "labor army,"[8] for instance, provides an example of the type of "pedagogy" appropriate for the "Papuans"; there is no need to resort to "slavery" or to colonialism as a "mechanically" inevitable historical stage, etc. With his sarcasm, Spaventa, who looked at things from the standpoint of the liberal bourgeoisie against the "historicist" sophisms of the reactionary classes, expressed an idea that was much more progressive and dialectical.

Cf. Notebook 11, §1.

§<201>. *The* Popular Manual. *On art*. The section devoted to art contains a statement to the effect that even the most recent works on aesthetics assert the unity of form and content.[1] This can be taken as one of the most glaring examples of the critical inability to establish the history of concepts and to identify the real significance of the concepts themselves in the cultural sphere. In fact, the identification of content with form is affirmed by idealist aesthetics (Croce), based on idealist premises and terminology. Therefore, neither "content" nor "form" means what the *Manual* supposes. The identity of form and content means nothing more than the fact that in art the content is not the "abstract subject"—that is, the novelistic plot or some generic complex of sentiments. Rather, the content of art is art itself, a philosophical category, a "distinct moment" of the spirit, etc. Nor does form mean "technique," as the *Manual* supposes, etc.

Cf. Notebook 11, §19.

§<202>. *The* Popular Manual. What can "science" be taken to mean when dealing with the *Manual*? And when is the concept of "science"

hand on the blank page preceding the frontispiece: "Antonio Gramsci—Ustica—December 1926."

Gramsci quotes Galiani in Notebook 1, § 120.

3. The "mutual" or monitorial teaching method was developed during the late eighteenth century by Joseph Lancaster and Andrew Bell. Early in the nineteenth century it was adopted in various parts of Europe (Confalonieri was one of its leading proponents in Italy), England, the United States, and Canada. It was a system intended to resolve the problem of how to provide mass elementary education with relatively few teachers and limited funds. In the highly formalized and rigidly structured system perfected by Lancaster, a teacher would instruct the better pupils to help the other children and monitor their study. By using children to teach other children it was believed possible to provide education for large numbers without the need to hire many teachers and assistants. Institutions organized along these lines were also commonly referred to as Lancaster schools.

Gino Capponi (1792–1876) was a moderate liberal politician, historian, and educator from Tuscany. In *Frammento sull' educazione,* written in 1841 but published only four years later, he criticized pedagogical practices which suffocated the child's mental development by the superimposition of precepts. He argued for a pedagogy which would allow the child's mind to unfold or develop freely—a view clearly influenced by the ideas of Rousseau and by naturalistic theories of education, such as those put forward by the Swiss educator J.H. Pestalozzi (mentioned by Gramsci in Notebook 1, §123).

Ferrante Aporti (1791–1858), an educator, established some of the earliest infant schools in Italy. He was a teacher and school administrator in Cremona before moving to Piedmont in 1848 when he was made senator. His liberal approach to education (as well as politics) strongly reflected the influence of Rousseau and Pestalozzi. On Aporti and infant schools, see also Notebook 5, §3.

4. Moderate liberals and reformers organized several professional associations, initiatives, journals, etc. which cut across state boundaries and fostered a sense of national identity. Among the most important of these were the scientific congresses which were held annually starting in 1839 and attracted participants from all over Italy.

5. Among the most important journals were *Il Politecnico* founded by Carlo Cattaneo in 1839 and *Il Risorgimento* which started appearing in 1847 and to which Cavour himself contributed.

ing to him, has had the same conceit that it before all nations invented the comforts of human life and that its remembered history goes back to the very beginning of the world."

4. Gramsci had written on this topic in 1926 in his unfinished essay "Alcuni temi della questione meridionale" ("Some Aspects of the Southern Question"). For a translation of an especially relevant passage, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 11.

5. Gramsci is referring to p. 671 of his manuscript; see Notebook 4, §38.

6. See, especially, Notebook 2, §116 and §117; Notebook 3, §117, §126, and §141; and Notebook 5, §30, §37, §74, §82, §83, and §100. All of these were written prior to this note.

7. Gramsci's disclaimer here is very similar to his cautionary remarks at the end of Notebook 4, §16; see also the first page of Notebook 11 and the opening paragraph of Notebook 8.

8. Gramsci later incorporated most of his scattered notes on American intellectuals in Notebook 22, which he entitled "Americanism and Fordism."

9. On Kulturkampf, see Notebook 1, §5, n. 2.

10. On Plutarco Calles, whose implementation of the Mexican constitution's provisions on religion and education triggered a violent struggle with the Catholic Church, see Notebook 1, §107, n. 3.

11. See, especially, Notebook 3, §5.

12. Gramsci is referring to Notebook 3, §28.

§50. *The common school*

1. Gramsci's term "*scuola unitaria*" (translated here as "common school") could also be rendered as "comprehensive school" or, perhaps, as "unified school." It should be kept in mind that Gramsci's notes on education often contain an implicit critique of the education reform enacted by the Fascist government on May 6, 1923. The reform was designed primarily by the philosopher and ideologue Giovanni Gentile, who at the time was Mussolini's minister of education. One of the salient features of the "*riforma* Gentile," as it was frequently called, was its separation of technical and vocational or professional training from "classical" education (the latter was reserved for the preparation of select students who were meant to move on to the universities).

2. Giovanni Gentile emphasized the importance of "active education" while condemning traditional pedagogy, which, in his view, assigned students a purely passive role.

§52. *Americanism and Fordism*

1. I.e., Leon Trotsky.